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RENEE NEWMAN KNAKE*
One of the most significant problems faced by the legal profession in the
twenty-first century is the ineffective delivery of legal services. Millions in need
of legal representation are unable to afford a lawyer and thousands of lawyers
are unemployed. We are desperate for a solution to democratize access to the
law through efficient and affordable delivery of legal services.
Noted law scholars and economists have argued over the years that corporate
ownership of law firms can offer a solution to this problem. For example,
corporations like Wal-Mart or Google are especially adept at disseminating
services and information to the mass public. These kinds of corporations are
also financially situated to make substantial capital outlays and await a later
return on the investment. Both of these attributes make corporate ownership of
law firms an appealing avenue for increasing access to legal services. Yet
professional conduct rules in all fifty states and the District of Columbia ban
corporations from owning or investing in law firms.
This Article identifies a First Amendment jurisprudential thread that
establishes important constitutional interests in the delivery of legal services
by corporations through the ownership of law practices. The Supreme Court
initially recognized First Amendment protection for the delivery of legal
services by a corporate entity in NAACP v. Button and most recently
confirmed in Citizens United v. FEC that a corporation, whether nonprofit or
for-profit, enjoys the same free speech rights as an individual. Under this
precedent, blanket bans on corporate investment in law practices are unlikely
to survive. This expanded understanding of First Amendment rights for
corporations parallels the economic realities of modern law practice and the
regulatory changes underway in the United Kingdom and Australia. Now is the
time to embrace the benefits that can accrue from corporate ownership, in
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particular the democratization of law through the delivery of more accessible
and affordable legal services.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant problems faced by the legal profession in the
twenty-first century is the ineffective delivery of legal services. Millions in need
of representation cannot afford to hire a lawyer,' let alone make an informed
decision about the best-suited lawyer for their needs. Indeed, many do not even
realize when a lawyer might be necessary or helpful. A nation that holds itself
out as a beacon of justice and an exemplar of the rule of law to the rest of the
world denies meaningful access to the law on a daily basis to the majority of its
population. Lawyers are out of reach for most individuals unless they enjoy
extreme affluence or subsist at poverty levels.2
I In New York State, for example, "some 2.3 million people a year... cannot afford
representation" for "civil cases that deal with 'the essentials of life' like eviction and child
support." William Glaberson, Judge's Budget Will Seek Big Expansion of Legal Aid to the
Poor in Civil Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 2010, at A21; see also infra note 180.
2See Glaberson, supra note 1; see also RICHARD SussKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?:
RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES 235 (2008) (observing that "solving legal
problems and resolving disputes is affordable, in practice, only to the very rich or those who
are eligible for some kind of state support").
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This unmet need is not due to a lack of lawyers. Law schools are graduating
new attorneys at an unprecedented rate,3 and thousands of unemployed
attomeys4 are eager to offer their services. One might think that an easy solution
to this problem would be for these lawyers to simply set up solo or small
practices in the local community, and the clients could then find them. Or, one
might propose that government and nonprofit legal aid organizations expand
legal assistance, or that lawyers ratchet up their pro bono hours. To date, these
solutions have not proven effective. 5 These solutions are not likely to offer the
revolutionary sort of change that is needed for the delivery of legal services
today.
Our commercialized, technology-driven, and increasingly global society
demands an entirely new framework for the delivery of legal services. This
observation necessarily begs several questions. How do we effectively match
clients to lawyers in a way that is affordable to the client but allows the lawyer
to make a living without the burdens and conflicts wrought by an extraordinary
caseload or the pressure of billable hours? How do we educate and inform the
public about the law so they understand when the services of a lawyer are
necessary or desirable? How do we preserve lawyer independence and a vibrant
rule of law culture while simultaneously cultivating new opportunities for legal
assistance? In other words, how do we increase the speech about access to the
law?
Access to the law-that is, facilitating and delivering legal services-goes
to the very heart of First Amendment concerns and values by contributing to
Justice Holmes's marketplace of ideas, 6 acting as a checkpoint on government
3 Approximately 43,000 law degrees were distributed in 2009, an I1 % increase from a
decade ago in 1999. The Great Law School 'Rip-off': By the Numbers, THE WEEK (Jan. 11,
2011, 2:50 PM), http://theweek.com/article/index/210930/the-great-law-school-rip-off-by-
the-numbers.
4See, e.g., Layoff Tracker, LAW SHUCKS: LIFE IN & AFTER BIGLAW,
http://lawshucks.com/layoff-tracker/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2012) ("As of December 11, 2011,
over 15,435 people have been laid off by major law firms (5,872 lawyers/9,563 staff) since
January 1, 2008."). Significantly, this data does not include layoffs that occurred in small or
mid-sized firms, solo practices, or government offices, nor does it include layoffs pre-2008
or post-December 2011.
5 If anything, the situation is at risk of worsening. As one indicator, at the time of this
writing, Congress is considering the Spending Reduction Act of 2011, which, among other
things, would eliminate all funding for the Legal Services Corporation, the primary provider
of legal aid in the United States for non-criminal matters ($420 million annually). See Jim
Jordan, Spending Reduction Act of 2011, REPUBLICAN STUDY COMMITTEE, 1 (Jan. 2011),
http://rsc.jordan.house.gov/UploadedFiles/SpendingReduction Act--TWOPAGER.pdf; see
also SUSSKI4, supra note 2, at 235 ("One possibility is to increase state funding of legal
services.... [T]his looks very unlikely to happen, not least because justice (especially civil
justice) tends to compete poorly with other demands on the public purse ..... ).6 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .. "). For a thoughtful explanation of Justice Holmes's use of the marketplace
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action,7 facilitating individual development, 8  and cultivating political
discourse.9 One of the biggest obstacles compromising access to legal services
in the United States is delivery. Individuals lack information about their legal
needs. They do not know where to find a lawyer, other than in the yellow pages,
or perhaps by searching the Internet, where advertising by personal injury
lawyers and settlement mills dominates. 10 Lawyers similarly struggle to deliver
affordable, effective service, especially outside of the high-end private law firm
context.
In some ways, speech about access to the law is protected from government
restriction. Advertising is an example of speech about access to the law. In
Bates v. State Bar11 the Supreme Court held that blanket bans against
advertising by lawyers violate the First Amendment. 12 The Court recognized
not only important free speech interests for lawyers in communicating about
their services, but also for individuals in obtaining access to the law. 13
Significantly, in overturning the advertising ban, the Court observed that it
"likely has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-
quite-poor and the unknowledgeable."' 14 While Bates involved commercial
speech, the Court seemed to apply a stronger form of Central Hudson]5 scrutiny
to protect attorney advertising because it was speech about access to the law.
Additional constitutional protections that support access to the law include the
Sixth Amendment's right to effective assistance of counsel 16 and voting
rights. 17
concept, see Ronald K.L. Collins, Holmes' Idea Marketplace-Its Origins and Legacy,
FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (May 13, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/
commentary.aspx?id=22945. See also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 41 (David
Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) ("Wrong opinions and
practices gradually yield to fact and argument: but facts and arguments, to produce any
effect on the mind, must be brought before it.").7 See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. REs. J. 521, 527. Vincent Blasi's "checking value" demands protection of speech
that can "serve in checking the abuse of power by public officials." Id.8 See generally Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 204, 215-22 (1972) (discussing the role of autonomy in the context of free expression).
9 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF
GOVERNMENT 96-98 (1948) (credited with establishing the modem understanding of First
Amendment political speech); CASS SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH 130 (1993) (treating speech as political "when it is both intended and received as a
contribution to public deliberation about some issue" (emphasis omitted)).
10For a discussion of advertising by so-called "settlement mills," see Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Run-ofthe-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1492-93 (2009).
11433 U.S. 350 (1977).
121d. at 384.
131d.
14Id. at 376-77.
15 See infra discussion of Central Hudson at notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
16See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy... the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."). But see Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
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But in other ways-important ways-speech about access to the law
remains unprotected, a troubling reality given the fundamental value of such
speech to our democratic government and the rule of law. For example, during
the 2009 Term, the Supreme Court declined to decide whether a restriction in a
federal bankruptcy statute limiting an attorney's advice to a client could
withstand a First Amendment challenge. 18 That same term, the Court upheld a
federal statute prohibiting an attorney from advising a client about how to
petition representative bodies like the United Nations or how to negotiate a
peace treaty.19 As I have written elsewhere, these decisions are problematic
because access to legal advice rests at the core of democratic government. 20 The
Court similarly has refused to examine the constitutionality of rules that
constrict an attorney's criticism of a judge.21 Bans on a lawyer's advice to a
client or a lawyer's criticism of the judiciary risk silencing the most
knowledgeable source-and in some instances perhaps the only source-of
speech about access to the law.
Lawyer discipline and professional conduct rules that forbid corporations
from owning or investing in a law firm or law practice 22 are another form of
speech restriction that compromises access to the law. Under rules effective
throughout the United States, corporations are prohibited from law practice
ownership or investment.23 The historic abhorrence for corporate ownership and
745, 764 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In many ways, having a lawyer becomes one of
the many indignities visited upon someone who has the ill fortune to run afoul of the
criminal justice system.").
17See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (forbidding discrimination in voting based on race); id.
amend. XIX (forbidding discrimination based on sex); id. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll
taxes); id. amend. XXVI (granting right to vote to citizens over eighteen years of age).
18See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339
(2010) (declining to "consider whether the [bankruptcy] statute [banning legal advice] so
construed withstands First Amendment scrutiny").
19 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (applying a
"more demanding standard" of review and holding that the antiterrorism material support
statute constitutionally prohibits "expert advice or assistance" in the form of advice about
petitioning representative bodies like the United Nations or negotiating peace treaties given
to a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization).
20 See Renee Newman Knake, Attorney Advice and the First Amendment, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 639, 643-44 (2011).
21 For example, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari twice to cases challenging
Michigan's so-called civility rules-Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct 3.5 and 6.5-
that restrict lawyers' criticism of the judiciary. See Fieger v. Supreme Court, 130 S. Ct. 1048
(2010) (mem.) (cert. denied); Fieger v. Mich. Grievance Adm'r, 549 U.S. 1205 (2007)
(mem.) (cert. denied).
221 use the term "law practice" primarily in the Article, but it could be interchanged
with "law firm," "legal representation," or "legal services," meaning that whether a
corporation chooses to purchase an existing law firm, establish its own law practice/legal
services delivery system, or sell services from its existing in-house legal department, similar
economic and constitutional concerns are at stake.23 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011).
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investment in law practices is purportedly justified by concerns about the
preservation of lawyer independence/professionalism and, more specifically, the
avoidance of confidentiality breaches and conflicts of interest.24 Bar regulators
disregard the potential benefit that might be realized by corporate delivery of
legal services, reasoning that lawyers' independence and professional reputation
as well as clients' security must take precedence. 25 Such a position, however,
ignores the extensive body of professional conduct rules that currently supports
these goals and would continue to protect lawyer independence even if
corporations engaged in the delivery of legal representation.26
Corporations like Google27 and Wal-Mart28 know a great deal about the
delivery of services, goods, and information to the mass public. These
corporations and many others have the capacity to make significant financial
outlays into innovative mechanisms for providing legal services and await a
delayed return on that investment. For example, in January 2011, Google's
venture capital arm announced a several-hundred-thousand-dollar investment
24 See, e.g., Richard C. Weber, Law Firms Should Spurn Outside Investments, BUS.
WEEK (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/management/law-firms-should-
spum-outside-investments-0920201 I.html ("From the very beginning, the lawyer-client
relationship has been treated as fundamentally different from a business relationship-
because it is. The relationship is protected by a unique privilege for attorney-client
communication and the professional ethic that lawyers must unequivocally put client
interests first.").2 5 See discussion infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
26 The entire body of Model Rules of Professional Conduct arguably furthers the goal
of protecting the profession's reputation, but Part 8 of the Model Rules, Maintaining the
Integrity of the Profession, is especially targeted to do so. As for protecting clients from
conflicts or other concerns that might be associated with nonlawyer ownership or
investment, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, & 1.10 on conflicts of
interest, as well as id. R. 1.6 on confidentiality of information.27 Given Google's professed mission "to organize the world's information and make it
universally accessible and useful," it seems at least plausible, if not a foregone conclusion,
that the company might desire to bring its expertise to legal information through ownership
of or investment in law firms, or through selling its in-house legal services. See Corporate
Information, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/corporate/index.html (last visited Jan. 30,
2012). Indeed, in November 2009, Google launched a new search engine for legal opinions.
See Finding the Laws that Govern Us, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Nov. 17, 2009, 9:05 AM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/l1/fmding-laws-that-govem-us.html ("Starting today,
we're enabling people everywhere to find and read full text legal opinions from U.S. federal
and state district, appellate and supreme courts using Google Scholar.").2 8 Lest the example of Wal-Mart seem too far-fetched, it is worth noting that Tesco, the
United Kingdom's equivalent to the United States' Wal-Mart, "has been offering legal
services in the United Kingdom since at least 2004, when it began to offer advice on divorce,
employment and business online." Christopher J. Whelan, The Paradox of Professionalism:
Global Law Practice Means Business, 27 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 465, 491 n. 193 (2008); see
also discussion infra notes 218-60 and accompanying text. Wal-Marts across the country
already offer services such as optometry and banking.
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into LawPivot, 29 a website where companies are matched with lawyers to
receive crowdsourced 30 and confidential legal advice. Or consider that London-
based WHSmith stores began hosting legal kiosks in 500 stores in the fall of
2011 through a partnership with QualitySolicitors, a British legal services
provider.31 British shoppers can purchase a newspaper and obtain routine legal
assistance such as divorce filings, wills, real estate transactions, and basic
contracts in the same location. In the United States, Wal-Mart already offers
financial and medical services to its customers. 32 It is not difficult to imagine
other alternative law delivery models that might be developed if a company like
Google could take the next step to directly own or invest in a law practice, or if
Wal-Mart could add a legal assistance window next to the banking center or
health care provider located in its stores.
The estimated thirty million households that do not have bank accounts (or
use one sparingly) 33 that Wal-Mart aims to serve by offering financial services
are the very same individuals least likely to have access to a lawyer when they
would benefit from it. Seventy percent of these households earn less than
$30,000 annually.34 They cannot afford a lawyer who bills by the hour at a
three-figure rate, particularly for assistance with issues that they are most apt to
need, such as divorce, wills, mortgage foreclosure, child support, or
immigration. Professor Richard Susskind, an expert on the United Kingdom's
legal profession, predicts that nonlawyer investors like corporations are
29 See Debra Cassens Weiss, Crowdsourced Legal Answers Website Gets $600k from
Investors, Including Google Ventures, A.B.A. J. ONLINE (Jan. 21, 2011, 11:16 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/news/article/crowdsourcedlegal-answers-websitegets_600k_f
rom investors includinggoogl/ (announcing that LawPivot "is getting $600,000 in funding
from Google Ventures and individual investors").30 Crowdsourced or crowdsourcing is defined as "trying to find a way of completing a
task, a solution to a problem, etc. by asking a wide range of people or organisations if they
can help, typically by using the Internet." Definition of Crowdsourcing, MACMILLAN
DICTIONARY (2011), http://www.macmillandictionary.com/buzzword/entries/crowdsourcing.
html.
31 See Catherine Baksi, Quality Solicitors in WHSmith Tie-up, LAW GAZETTE (Apr. 7,
2011), http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/qualitysolicitors-whsmith-tie; John Eligon, Selling
Pieces of Law Firms to Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011, at B1 ("England began this
month to allow groups other than lawyers to own and control law practices, and some of the
country's major retailers have begun offering legal services in their stores and online.").32 See, e.g., Ylan Q. Mui, Retailers Take on New Role: Banker, WASH. POST, Feb. 1,
2011, at A12 ("Millions of low-income Americans who don't have bank accounts are
finding an alternative to check-cashing stores at an unusual place: their local big-box
retailer.... Wal-Mart has opened roughly 1,500 MoneyCenters that process as many as 5
million transactions each week."); 400 Health Clinics to Open in Wal-Mart Stores in the
Next Three Years, Up to 2,000 Could Open Next Five to Seven Years, WAL-MART CORP.
(Apr. 24, 2007), http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/news/6419.aspx.33 See Mui, supra note 32 ("According to a recent government survey, nearly 30
million households either do not have a bank account or use one sparingly.").34 1d. ("Nearly 70 percent of families considered 'unbanked' earn less than $30,000 a
year and many say they will never do business at a bank.").
2012]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
attracted to what some might characterize as these "'low-end' legal service[s],
such as consumer law and Legal Aid work" because they "see scope for more
rigorous processes and the introduction of systems that can radically overhaul
the conventional ways of operating." 35 Nonlawyer investors understand that a
profit canbe realized by offering these services through "bulk legal processing
capabilities" rather than through "myriad sole practioners and small firms
across the land."'36 For these and related reasons, noted legal scholars and
economists have recommended for decades that corporations be allowed to own
and invest in law practices.37 Yet the bans endure.
The First Amendment value in the delivery of legal services by corporations
has gone largely ignored, notwithstanding the ongoing debate about the
practical benefits or consequences of corporate law practice ownership and
investment. This Article is the first to identify and discuss in detail a
jurisprudential thread establishing the First Amendment interests associated
with the delivery of legal services by corporations. The Court initially
recognized the First Amendment value of legal services delivery by a corporate
entity in NAACP v. Button38 and has continued to affirm and expand this
proposition over the years. 39 More recently, in Citizens United v. FEC,40 a
majority of the Justices confirmed that the First Amendment applies equally to a
corporation and individuals, and expanded prior cases on the importance of
speech to further economic competition. 4'
In light of this precedent extending over half a century, the blanket
suppression of corporate law practice ownership must give way to the First
Amendment rights of corporations, lawyers, and individuals associated with the
delivery of legal services. This is not to say that a corporation's involvement
with a law practice must be left completely unregulated, just that it cannot be
prohibited outright. The American Bar Association 20/20 Commission is
currently exploring reforms to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
encompass this very issue.42 The First Amendment demands that bar authorities
and other regulators embrace-not just explore-the concept of corporate law
practice ownership and investment, particularly to the extent such arrangements
can democratize law through the delivery of more accessible and affordable
legal services. 43 If they choose not to do so, the matter inevitably will be
35 SUSSKIND, supra note 2, at 253.
3 6 1d.
37 See discussion infra notes 52-80 and accompanying text.
38371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
3 9 See discussion infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
40 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
41 See discussion infra notes 194-209 and accompanying text.
4 2 See Speakers Debate Nonlawyers' Role in Firms at First Ethics 20/20 Commission
Hearing, 26 LAw. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 110 (Feb. 17, 2010), available
at http://www.abanet.org/ethics2020/bnart. 1.pdf.
43 To date, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, charged with revision of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, has declined to recommend nonlawyer ownership and
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decided in the courts-or legislatively, should Congress or the states choose to
act.44 For example, litigation challenging nonlawyer ownership bans is
underway in federal courts in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut,45 and
the North Carolina legislature considered a bill to permit corporate ownership of
law firms during the 2011 session.46
It is important to be precise about the question addressed here: this Article
considers neither whether a corporation is entitled to legal advice, nor whether a
corporation holds a constitutional right to petition judicial, legislative, and
administrative bodies. This Article does not dispute a state's authority to
regulate the credentials of those individuals licensed to practice law.47 Rather,
investment in this way. See Letter from ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 Working Grp. on
Alternative Bus. Structures, For Comment: Issues Paper Concerning Alternative Business
Structures, to ABA Entities, Courts, Bar Associations (state, local, specialty and
international), Law Schools, and Individuals (Apr. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from ABA
Comm'n], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/abs_issuespaper.authcheckdam.pdf. The Commission has indicated a
willingness to consider a proposal that would allow for some forms of minority nonlawyer
ownership, but corporations would still be prohibited from being majority owners of law
practices. See discussion infra note 243 and accompanying text.44 Historically, regulation of the legal profession has been left largely to the states. In
recent years, however, Congress has begun to take an increasing interest in regulating the
relationship between lawyers and their clients. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724 (2010) (banning certain advice from a lawyer to a client that
has been designated as a "foreign terrorist organization"); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1339 (2010) (banning certain advice from a lawyer to her
client about filing for bankruptcy).
45In May 2011, the plaintiffs' law firm Jacoby & Meyers filed three lawsuits
challenging the ownership and investment ban in ABA Model Rule 5.4 in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut. See Mark Hamblett, Suit Challenges N.Y Prohibition of Non-
Lawyer Firm Ownership, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE (May 20, 2011),
http://www.newyorklawjoumal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202494645339 ("In virtually
identical lawsuits filed Wednesday in New York, Connecticut and New Jersey, Jacoby &
Meyers casts its challenge as client-friendly, claiming the ban on nonlawyer investment
denies firms the ability to raise outside capital, denying most lawyers 'a critical source of
funding' that 'dramatically impedes access to legal services for those otherwise unable to
afford them."').
46The bill was introduced by Senator Hartsell in the General Assembly of North
Carolina during the 2011 session, and it would have allowed for "nonattomey ownership of
professional corporation law firms, subject to certain requirements." S.B. 254, 2011 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2011), available at http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2011/Bills/
Senate/HTML/S254v0.html.
4 7 As Professor Andrews notes:
The difference is important. For even if it is agreed that lawyers should be licensed, and
that those who cannot meet the licensing requirements should be prohibited from
practicing law, it does not follow intuitively or necessarily that nonlawyers should be
prohibited from offering their nonlegal resources and talents in a business combination
with lawyers practicing law.
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this Article is concerned solely with the question of whether or not a
corporation holds a First Amendment right to engage with lawyers for the
purpose of delivering legal services (and, of course, whether or not an
individual holds a corresponding interest in the delivery of those legal services).
This Article is in some ways descriptive, in that one of my purposes is to
document how First Amendment jurisprudence has evolved to support the
protection of legal services delivery by corporations. Yet, this also is a novel
conclusion and the normative ramifications that flow from it cannot be ignored,
particularly given the economic realities of modern law practice and the
emerging deregulation of the legal profession occurring in other countries.
Corporate ownership of law practices has the potential to democratize the
delivery of legal services in an innovative way. My intent here is not to propose
or advocate for a particular model of corporate ownership or investment. Not
only have a number of scholars already engaged in serious study about this
matter,48 but we also have access to anecdotal information49 and we soon will
be able to evaluate empirical data gathered from nations like Australia and the
United Kingdom where recent reforms enable corporate ownership and
investment.50 Accordingly, this Article leaves for another day the tasks of
offering specific recommendations about a particular course of action for
corporations desiring to deliver legal services or proposing a particular set of
safeguards that should be put into place. 51 I do, however, suggest corporate
Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlawyers in the Business of Law: Does the One Who Has the Gold
Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 577, 578-79 (1989). For an argument on the
unconstitutionality of licensing requirements, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law,
2010 WIs. L. REV. 749, 806-07 ("The extra costs of legal representation resulting from
forcing lawyers to attend law school and pass a bar exam therefore may not be worth the
benefits in terms of protecting clients from shoddy or dishonest work. These policy
arguments could fuel constitutional challenges to lawyer licensing by raising questions as to
the public interest served by the regulation." (later citing Andrew W. Perlman, A Bar
Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 135 (2004); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional
Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,
34 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1981))).48 See discussion infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., Steve Mark, Views from an Australian Regulator, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 45,
63 ("The [New South Wales] experience in regulating incorporation has been positive. Far
from being the means by which legal practitioners subvert the ethics of the profession,
incorporation can provide lawyers with the incentive to more stringently formalize ethical
behavior. I have found that, by and large, [incorporated legal practices] have embraced the
systemization of compliance we have introduced, and as a result have reaped the rewards in
terms of effective and efficient management.").50 See discussion infra Part IV.
511 do not mean to avoid the seriousness or importance of this inquiry by setting it
aside for purposes of this Article. Rather, here, my intent is to focus primarily on the First
Amendment analysis relevant to corporate ownership and investment in law practices.
Nevertheless, as regulators contemplate the lifting of the Model Rule 5.4 ban on external
ownership and investment, they must also deliberate over the nature of safeguards that
[Vol. 73:1
DEMOCRATIZING THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SER VICES
ownership and investment in legal services delivery as a viable solution to
address the dire access-to-justice problem facing the United States in the
twenty-first century. Furthermore, I rely upon this position to evaluate how a
court would likely weigh the state's interest in regulating the legal profession
compared to the corporation's interest (and the lawyer's interest, as well as the
potential client's interest) in the delivery of legal services.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of the
relevant professional conduct rules, primarily American Bar Association Model
Rule 5.4 governing the professional independence of a lawyer, and offers a brief
history of the Rule's development. Part III engages in a detailed review of the
Supreme Court precedent supporting the corporation's First Amendment right
to deliver legal services by investing in and owning law practices. The Article
wraps up in Part IV with a summary of proposals for corporate ownership of
and investment in law practices, including a brief discussion related to
regulatory reforms in Australia and the United Kingdom. I conclude that
attorney professional conduct rules must be reformed to permit corporations to
finance law practices and deliver legal services-a pragmatic and prudent
conclusion given the pervasive unmet need and vast untapped market for legal
services in this country. This deregulation has the potential to increase
competition, drive down prices, encourage inventive methods for providing
legal representation to those who cannot access or afford it, and create new jobs
for lawyers.
II. IN A CITIZENS UNITED WORLD, WHAT REMAINS OF STATE
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES BANNING CORPORATE OWNERSHIP OF
LAW FIRMS?
A collective reading of NAACP v. Button and its progeny, the commercial
speech cases including Bates v. State Bar, and the Court's recent decision in
Citizens United v. FEC suggests that state professional conduct rules banning
corporations from owning and investing in law practices impair important First
Amendment interests. The form in which these companies or others should
finance law practices, as a matter of sound public policy, remains open to
question and debate. In the wake of Citizens United, however, a lift on the state
bans against corporate law firm ownership may very well be inevitable.
Attorney professional conduct rules throughout the country prohibit
corporations from owning or investing directly in law practices.52 While the
should remain for preserving lawyer independence and for protecting client interests. A
particularly critical point of inquiry will be to explore the role of the insurance industry,
perhaps drawing lessons from the medical care industry as well as from countries like
Australia and the United Kingdom, where deregulation of the legal profession is well
underway.
52 For a detailed history of the ABA's ban on nonlawyer ownership of law firms, see
Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal for
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rules have been upheld by various courts on a few occasions in the context of
unauthorized practice,53 those decisions occurred in a pre-Citizens United world
and did not consider the ownership/investment by corporations into the
practices of licensed attorneys for the purpose of facilitating the delivery of
legal representation. Setting aside potential benefits or costs associated with
corporate financing, if the majority's opinion 54 in Citizens United means what it
says about corporate speech, these blanket bans are problematic in their
interference with the corporation's right to own and invest in the delivery of
legal services, a right derived from the First Amendment as first recognized by
the Court in Button.
The notion of a First Amendment right for corporations to deliver legal
services is controversial, to be sure, as is the suggestion that Citizens United
might confirm a corporation's right to engage in such a practice. Legal
profession scholars and business law experts have written extensively over the
years weighing the merits of nonlawyer law practice ownership and
investment.55 The ink is only beginning to flow about the consequences of
Citizens United.56 In the months following the decision's release, scholars
Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 3-11 (1998). See also discussion
of state professional conduct rules infra note 64.53 See, e.g., Lawline v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 956 F.2d 1378, 1386-87 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding that Model Rules 5.4(b) and 5.5(b) are rationally related to the legitimate state
interests of safeguarding the public, maintaining the integrity of the legal profession, and
protecting the administration of justice; no First Amendment violation in prohibiting
association of nonlawyers in partnership with lawyers); Turner v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 407 F.
Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975) (finding no violation of non-lawyers' First Amendment rights in
ban on partnership between lawyers and nonlawyers). Signficantly, both of these challenges
involved practice of law by nonlawyers, not the issue addressed in this Article, namely the
delivery of legal services by lawyers through an arrangement involving ownership or
investment by a corporation.54 When referring to the "majority opinion" in Citizens United, I refer to the portions of
the opinion authored by Justice Kennedy and joined in concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 877
(2010).
55 Compare Adams & Matheson, supra note 52, at 1-2 (advocating for the lifting of
state restrictions on nonlawyer investment in law firms and suggesting that the benefits to
this proposal "include capital for expansion, capital for investment in new technologies and
new lawyers, financing for contingency fee cases, and a myriad of other rewards"), with
Susan Gilbert & Larry Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Moderate Proposals Deserve a
Chance, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 383, 392-400 (1988) (noting that debate about reform to
Model Rule 5.4 during a February 1983 ABA meeting was essentially shutdown on the so-
called "fear of Sears"-i.e., the idea that Sears could own a law firm). See also discussion
infra Part IV.
56 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, No Middle Ground? Reflections on the Citizens
United Decision, 96 IOWA L. REV. 649, 650 (2010) (suggesting that Justice Kennedy wrote
such a "bold-some would say reckless" opinion "to make clear in no uncertain terms that
corporations and other forms of organizations are as fully protected by the First Amendment
as are individuals"); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REv. 581, 585 (2011) (contending that the "Court's analysis in Citizens United is
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quickly (and critically) weighed in on the potential impact to First Amendment
jurisprudence and the political landscape, particularly for federal and state
elections.5 7 The decision's influence on the law of lawyering, however, has yet
to be identified, let alone fully explained or appreciated.58 Commentators
speculate about what Citizens United means for business regulations. 59 This
Article, however, is the first to address the opinion's impact on the delivery of
legal services by corporations.
Sentiments are strong on both sides of this issue, as portrayed in legal ethics
expert Larry Fox's comments a decade ago:
The brashness [of a proposal allowing for corporate law firm ownership] left
me weak of knee, my forehead beaded with perspiration, palpitations
interrupting my ability to think straight. But then I recovered, recalling my
commitment to the ideas that lawyers are not just another set of service
likely to lead to new incoherence in the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence" and
assessing "the challenge such incoherence poses for lawyers arguing campaign finance cases
in the Supreme Court and lower courts"). For a lengthy list of commentary appearing in the
media and blogosphere following the Citizens United decision, see SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/citizens-united-v-federal-election-commission/
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012) (listing over 100 media links and nearly as many blog links).57 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and Its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77,
78 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/902.pdf (noting the "fury of critics of the
[Citizens United] opinion and the fierceness of their criticism" and that "[t]he ruling was
treated as a desecration"); Carol R. Goforth, "A Corporation Has No Soul"-Modern
Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Involvement in the Political Process, 47 Hous.
L. REv. 617, 651-61 (2010) (arguing that Citizens United was wrongly decided both as a
matter of original intent and as supported by important public policy reasons).5 8 For one example of scholarship identifying the impact of Citizens United beyond the
context of elections, see Tamara R. Piety, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regulatory
State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 16 (2010),
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fil/109/piety.pdf (observing that while Citizens
United "has been roundly criticized for its potential effect on elections and its display of
judicial immodesty.. . , the effect of the case which may be both most profound and perhaps
most pernicious is its effect on the commercial speech doctrine[,] . .. an aspect of the case
which has been largely overlooked"). Significantly, she does not consider the impact on the
lawyer advertising/solicitation commercial speech cases that are addressed in this Article.59 See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 56, at 660-61 ("The conferral of full free-speech
rights on corporations will likewise require us to consider a host of other settings in which
the speech of corporations is now highly regulated. The securities laws, for example, place
heavy limits on information published .... The corporation itself, as a form of business or
private or charitable organization, is pervasively regulated at the state and federal level. ...
Full First Amendment protection would likely require dramatic changes in these and related
regimes of corporate regulation. Is the Court willing to invite such claims? Nothing in the
opinion suggests that they were even considered.").
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
providers, that what separates us... is our commitment to a higher set of
values .... 60
In contrast, consider the more recent reflections of Bruce MacEwen, a noted
specialist in law firm economics, in an exchange with Professors Mitt Regan
and Larry Ribstein:
If anyone wants to mount a serious challenge to the ABA's medieval guild
mentality [against reforms like corporate ownership of law firms], show me
where to sign up. That our industry is the only one which attempts-with a
transparent lack of success-to cloak anticompetitive injunctions with the cloth
of "ethics" is as humiliating as it is depressing. 6 1
Weak in the knees, sweating, humiliated, depressed: regardless of the side
one takes, the debate on nonlawyer investment is not for the faint of heart.
Proponents maintain that corporate ownership and investment will help liberate
legal services by bringing affordable representation to the general population
and by addressing the well-documented, unmet need for lawyers. 62 Opponents
counter that corporate involvement will exacerbate the poor reputation of
lawyers, compromise lawyer independence, and subject lawyers to
insurmountable conflicts of interests driven by a profit motive instead of service
to the client.63 Neither side, however, seems to appreciate the First Amendment
interests inextricably bound up in the debate.
The central rule involved in the debate is ABA Model Rule 5.4. The rule
purports to guide the professional independence of a lawyer, and a similar if not
identical version has been adopted in all fifty states, with the District of
Columbia having a version that allows some forms of multidisciplinary practice,
but not external ownership. 64 Model Rule 5.4 provides, in relevant part, that
60 Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World: A Free Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55
Bus. LAW. 1533, 1534 (2000) (replying to Daniel Fischel's proposal to allow the market to
regulate lawyer and nonlawyer involvement rather than professional conduct rules).6 1 Bruce MacEwen, Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Larry Ribstein, Law Firms, Ethics, and
Equity Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 61, 61, 86-87 (2008) (discussing the impact of the
United Kingdom's Legal Services Act 2007 on American law firms and reflecting on
whether "a derivative instrument structured to reflect the implicit value of the firm" violates
Model Rule 5.4).62 See discussion infra Part IV.
63 See discussion infra Part IV.
64 See AM. BAR Ass'N & BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, LAWYERS' MANUAL ON
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 91:402 (2008) (noting that with one "notable" exception, the Dist.
of Columbia, "[m]ost jurisdictions that base their ethics rules on the ABA Model Rules do
not deviate appreciably from Rule 5.4(b) and Rule 5.4(d)"). The Lawyers' Manual describes
the small variations in the rules of North Carolina, Illinois, Oklahoma, Washington, Florida,
Kentucky, Utah, and the Dist. of Columbia. Id. at 91:402-03. While the District of
Columbia's rule is more permissive in that it allows for certain forms of multidisciplinary
practice, it does not permit a corporation to own or invest in a legal services delivery
mechanism. See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4, 5.7 (2007).
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"[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer" and "shall
not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the
partnership consist of the practice of law."65 The rule also states that "[a] lawyer
shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corporation or association
authorized to practice law for a profit if... a nonlawyer owns any interest
therein" or "a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer." 66 The ABA's
prohibition on nonlawyer investment in law firms extends back to the 1920s, 67
though the rule finds its origin in a New York State criminal statute enacted in
1909 at the request of individual lawyers concerned about competition from
corporations contracting with lawyers in bulk to provide legal advice to
subscribers. 68
According to the comments for Rule 5.4, the purpose of these restrictions is
to help avoid potential interference with a lawyer's professional judgment.69
The primary justifications advanced in support of the rule are: (1) the
preservation of lawyer independence, (2) professionalism and the reputation of
the legal profession, and (3) the avoidance of ethical dilemmas that are covered
elsewhere in the conduct rules, such as conflicts of interest, client
confidentiality, and the lawyer's duties to the client and the court. The ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (also known as the Kutak
Commission) during the early 1980s considered reforms that would have
allowed for nonlawyer investments under certain conditions, but the reforms
ultimately were rejected.70
As the Restatement notes, however, this rejection was not without costs.
Interestingly, and perhaps not surprisingly, the Restatement casts those costs as
harms suffered by lawyers:
One cost is that any kind of capital infusion that would entail granting an
ownership or security interest in the law firm itself... to a nonlawyer investor
6 5 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a), (b) (2011).
6 6 1d. R. 5.4(d)(1), (2).
67 See CANONS OF PROF'L ETHicS Canon 33 (1929). For more on the history of the rule,
see Adams & Matheson, supra note 52, at 4-14.
68See Bruce A. Green, The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice:
Their Derivation, Their Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate,
84 MiNN. L. REv. 1115, 1126-28 (2000).
69 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 cmt. 1; see also RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 cmt. b (2000) ("Those limitations are prophylactic and
are designed to safeguard the professional independence of lawyers. A person entitled to
share a lawyer's fees is likely to attempt to influence the lawyer's activities so as to
maximize those fees. That could lead to inadequate legal services."); id. § 10 cmt. c ("Here
also the concern is that permitting such ownership or direction would induce or require
lawyers to violate the mandates of the lawyer codes, such as by subjecting the lawyer to the
goals and interests of the nonlawyer in ways adverse to the lawyer's duties to a client.").
70For a detailed history of the debate within the American Bar Association on
multidisciplinary practice, see Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History,
and Process, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1625 (2000); see also Andrews, supra note 47, at 579-600.
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is prohibited.... [S]uch practical barriers to infusion of capital into law firms
significantly limit the ability of law firms to attain what its lawyers may
consider to be a more optimal size at which to provide higher-quality and
lower-price services to clients. They may also deter law firms from more
effectively competing with established law firms and with nonlawyer
organizations .... Further, unlike other persons in many.., occupations,
lawyers are unable to realize the present economic value of their reputations,
which otherwise could be obtained through sale to investors of stock or other
ownership interest. 7 1
Yet, all of the concerns identified by the Restatement ultimately harm the
public-not just lawyers-according to Professor Stephen Gillers, because
Model Rule 5.4 increases the cost of legal services. The rule does so by
"suppress[ing] competition on the supply side. The fewer the consumer
alternatives, the more lawyer-employers can charge for their employees'
time." 72 He sees the rule as "indefensibly lawyer-centered" 73 and rejects the
justification that it protects clients.74 Instead, he observes that "some lawyers
benefit and others lose, which is why the rule must be seen as serving the
interests of ABA control groups and not lawyers generally." 75 Thus, "[a] firm
that wants to accept lay investment and predicts it can without ignoring its
duties to keep confidences and exercise independent professional judgment may
not do so, no matter how persuasive a case it can make in support of its
prediction." 76 This protects "[e]stablished firms, with accumulated capital and
clientele, ... from the rapid growth of new competitors that private investment
might encourage," and hurts newer lawyers, "[b]ecause only other lawyers may
hire them to provide legal services to third persons for a profit, [and] the
number of these jobs will be limited by the number of lawyers willing to create
them."77
Writing over two and a half decades ago, significantly, Gillers predicted
that in the absence of Model Rule 5.4, "the number of these jobs [for newer
7 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 10 cmt. c. For further
discussion of Model Rule 5.4's anti-competitive effect, see Stephen Gillers, What We Talked
About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J.
243, 266-68 (1985). Professor Gillers argues that Model Rule 5.4 "must be counted as
serving the interests of some critical mass of lawyers, numerous and powerful enough" to
stop reform and that the rule "exclude[s] a major source of capital for new firms." Id. at
267-68. He notes: "In addition to the predictable downward pressure on fees that would
accompany increased competition, lay investors might be willing to accept a lower return on
their money." Id. at 268; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A
Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 10 (1981).72 Gillers, supra note 71, at 266-68.
7 3 Id. at 247.
74 See id. at 267.
75 Id. at 268.
76Id.
771Id.
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lawyers] likely would expand. '78 This is surely good news for recent law
graduates, facing unprecedented reductions in hiring. Ultimately, the clients are
the losers here, says Gillers.79 Those allowed to deliver legal services under this
rule are able to charge more for their time, and to constrict the number of
lawyers available, all to the detriment of the public. 80
In addition to Model Rule 5.4, other professional conduct rules potentially
limit corporate investment in law practices, including rules regarding the
unauthorized practice of law, 81 payment of legal fees by a third party without
client consent,82 and the ban against the sale of a law firm to nonlawyers. 83 As
Part III will show; to the extent that these rules forbid a corporation from
owning or investing in a law practice, it is questionable whether they can
withstand a First Amendment challenge, particularly in the wake of Citizens
United.
III. FROM NAACP v. BUTTON TO CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC: ESTABLISHING
THE CORPORATION'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DELIVER LEGAL
SERVICES THROUGH LAW PRACTICE OWNERSHIP/INVESTMENT
The First Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall make
no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. ' 84 This protection is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 85 The Supreme Court has long extended the protection of the First
Amendment to corporations, and the Court recently reaffirmed that this
protection is as strong for a company as it is for an individual.86
78 Gillers, supra note 71, at 268.
7 9 1d. (The rule of thumb has been that a law firm associate's time should be billed at a
rate that nets a profit of one-third after deduction of salary and overhead. That's a pretty
good margin, one other investors might be willing to undersell." (footnote omitted)).80 See id.
81 Model Rule 5.5 provides that a lawyer admitted in one jurisdiction "shall not practice
law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 (2011).82 See id. R. 1.8(f).
83 See id. R. 1.17.
84U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85 See id. amend. XIV.
86 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) ("The Court has recognized
that First Amendment protection extends to corporations." (listing twenty-two Supreme
Court cases dating back to 1952)); see also First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 777 (1978) ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the
public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association,
union, or individual.").
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Historically, courts and the academy devoted scant attention to intersections
between the lawyer conduct rules and the First Amendment. 87 In recent years,
however, this has changed somewhat, particularly once the Supreme Court
struck down the Arizona state bar rule banning lawyer advertisements.
88
Nevertheless, the First Amendment's application to rules prohibiting nonlawyer
investment in or ownership of law practices remains almost entirely unexplored
in academic literature. 89 One notable exception is an article from Professor
Gary Munneke, who nearly two decades ago presciently predicted the First
Amendment vulnerabilities of state restrictions on law firm diversification for
providing ancillary business. 90 Though he did not expressly contemplate the
merits of corporate law practice ownership, his First Amendment discussion
bears on the analysis here.
Professor Munneke suggested two approaches for testing "ethical rules that
restrict relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers: freedom of association
and commercial speech." 91 He recognized that both approaches were tenuous, at
least under the then-existing state of constitutional law. Munneke cautioned:
"Under a First Amendment approach, the freedom of association theory is
hampered by the possible application of a rational basis test of the legitimacy of
the state's regulatory scheme, while the commercial speech theory is generally
understood to apply to advertising rather than other forms of conduct. 92
Nevertheless, he maintained that "[e]thical rules governing conflicts of interests,
candor, confidentiality and other matters apply to lawyers in whatever they do,
and such rules, if vigorously enforced, are sufficient to protect the interests of
clients, individual lawyers and the legal profession," and therefore we do not
need bans on external investment or practice. 93 Not only do these same ethical
protections remain today, but as this Article illustrates, the First Amendment
vulnerabilities identified by Professor Munneke are significantly diminished
given the protection of corporate speech required post-Citizens United.
This Article proposes an alternative to Munneke's approach for testing rules
that restrict lawyer relationships with corporations. While I applaud him for
87 See Knake, supra note 20, at 660-63 (listing cases and articles addressing the First
Amendment and the regulation of attorney speech generally). For a noteworthy exception,
see MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 333-36 (4th
ed. 2010).88 See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); Knake, supra note 20, at 660
(listing advertising and soliciting cases decided by the Supreme Court from 1963 to 2010).89 See, e.g., Knake, supra note 20, at 660; Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers:
A New Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 595 (1992)
("Although this constitutional problem has been alluded to in the recent ABA debates, most
commentators have not explored the question fully." (footnote omitted)).
9 0 See Munneke, supra note 89, at 595.
9 1 1d
92 Id. at 614.
931d. at 615 ("We do not need and can ill-afford archaic rules designed merely to
maintain the economic hegemony of the legal profession, especially when those rules have
become counterproductive to their original purpose.").
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recognizing the issue, I have a somewhat different view of the Court's
jurisprudence on lawyer speech, at least in the context of legal services delivery.
Rather than applying a separate method of First Amendment analysis to each
category of speech as he does, a collective analysis of the cases (viewed with
the hindsight of Citizens United) establishes that corporate activity "undertaken
to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the
protection of the First Amendment," a right deserving of strong protection, as
the Court observed in United Transportation Union v. State Bar, discussed
more fully below.9 4 For now, what is essential to understand is that the Court's
recognition that the First Amendment protects "meaningful access" to legal
advice is really about the delivery of legal services, i.e., meaningful access is
achieved through meaningful delivery.
This "meaningful access" speech interest-i.e., what I equate with the
delivery of legal services-is bound up in the freedoms of speech, assembly,
and petition established in Button. This interest also extends to recipients of the
meaningful access speech, including individuals, the public, and the judiciary.
The Court has observed that under the First Amendment, "the protection
afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both." 95 This
includes a constitutional "right to receive information and ideas." 96 For
example, in the attorney advertising cases (discussed more fully below), the
Court recognized the legal rights of the targeted recipients of the speech, the
potential clients, and the public as a whole.97 This is true, said the Court, even if
the recipient's choice ultimately is undesirable:
To be sure, some citizens, accurately informed of their legal rights, may file
lawsuits that ultimately turn out not to be meritorious. But the State is not
entitled to prejudge the merits of its citizens' claims by choking off access to
94401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (emphasis added).
9 5 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756 (1976) (holding that a statutory ban on advertising drug prices for prescription drugs
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments).96 d. at 757 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v.
Porter, 766 P.2d 958, 967 (Okla. 1988) ("It is well established that the [C]onstitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas. The right of the public to receive suitable
access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences is crucial, for it is
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail.").97 For example, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court held unconstitutional a
state statute prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices, thus opening
the door to First Amendment protection for professional commercial speech. 425 U.S. at
757. To justify establishing this new protected category, the Court explained, "As to the
particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."
Id. at 763. The Court extended the protection to the commercial speech of attorneys in Bates
v. State Bar, 430 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
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information that may be useful to its citizens in deciding whether to press those
claims in court.98
There are at least three components to the notion that the First Amendment
protects meaningful access to the law with respect to the delivery of legal
services by corporations. First, the First Amendment's protections extend to
corporations as a potential source of speech and information about the law.
Second, the First Amendment right also includes the recipient's entitlement to
hear the speech and information about the law. Third, this dual right between
speaker and hearer exists even if it is exercised imprudently.
Consider the value of legal advice to the listener or recipient from a public
policy angle. According to Professor Stephen Pepper, "law is a public good that
is intended to be available for individuals to use in leading their lives.... This
means that a client has a clear interest in, and perhaps even an entitlement to,
knowledge of the law that governs her."99 He goes so far as to connect the
client's interest in legal advice and advocacy directly with political and
democratic values: "our democratic constitutional order presumes that persons
do have something approaching a 'right' to know 'the law' that purports to
govern them."' 100
Another commentator has offered public policy reasons that reveal the
wisdom of these cases. If it is true, as First Amendment scholar Martin Redish
observes, that the "fundamental, positive value of the constitutional free speech
guarantee is furtherance of individual self-realization,"''1 1 then it follows that
knowledge of the law is imperative for securing "the individual's ability and
opportunity to make all levels of life-affecting decisions, thereby controlling
and determining her life's course." 10 2 It thus becomes clear that the recipient's
right to meaningful access speech produced through the delivery of legal
services by a corporation is equally as important (if not even more important) to
the First Amendment as the corporation's right to deliver those services.
Let us now turn to a detailed discussion of the thread of Supreme Court
opinions establishing the nonlawyer corporation's First Amendment right to
engage in activity with lawyers to provide meaningful access to the law or, in
other words, to deliver legal services. This line of cases-from Button to
Citizens United-reveals the critical First Amendment interests held not only by
9 8 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 n.12 (1985); see also
Scanlon, supra note 8, at 222-24 (advancing an approach that would protect the listener-in
this case the client-by prohibiting government from banning speech-in this case an
attorney's advice-because it might influence the client).
99Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1598-99 (1995).
10O1d at 1599.
10 1 MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 71(2001).1021Id.
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corporations, but also individuals, lawyers, the judiciary, and the public
generally.
A. The First Amendment Value in the Delivery of Legal Services and
NAACP v. Button
First Amendment protection for the delivery of legal services by a
corporation stems from the 1963 decision NAACP v. Button,10 3 where the
Supreme Court held that states could not ban the delivery of legal services
through an arrangement involving the NAACP (a nonprofit corporation),' 0 4 its
affiliates, and lawyers. 10 5 Specifically, the Court examined "the right of the
NAACP and its members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting
persons who seek legal redress for infringements of their constitutionally
guaranteed and other rights."' 1 6 While framed in the context of the First
Amendment's protections for assembly and petition of the government, much of
the Court's opinion also rests upon the Free Speech Clause. The majority held
that the First Amendment protects advice from NAACP attorneys to prospective
litigants about seeking legal assistance, notwithstanding the Commonwealth's
power to regulate the legal profession and improper solicitation of legal
business. 10 7 As Professor Munneke says, "[Alt the heart of the case was the
mechanism for the delivery of legal services." 10 8 Similarly, Professor William
Eskridge characterizes Justice Brennan's treatment of the NAACP "as an
advocacy corporation having First Amendment rights of its own." 109 The Court
also recognized the political value inherent in legal advocacy, for "[g]roups
which find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot
frequently turn to the courts.... And under the conditions of modern
government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a
minority to petition for redress of grievances."' 11 Moreover, the Court
acknowledged and protected the interests of individuals in receiving the legal
advice and advocacy services, as well as the attorneys' interests in providing
representation."I ' In short, Button stands for the proposition that the First
103371 U.S. 415 (1963).
104Id. at 419 ("The NAACP was formed in 1909 and incorporated under New York law
as a nonprofit membership corporation in 1911.").
1051d. at 429.
106 Id. at 428.
107 Id. at 438 ("[O]nly a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the
State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.");
id. ("Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms."); see also Knake, supra note 20, at 665 (arguing that Button establishes
First Amendment protection for the advice an attorney renders to her client).
108 Munneke, supra note 89, at 604.
109 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2336 (2002).
110 Button, 371 U.S. at 429-30 (footnotes omitted).
I 11d. at 434-35.
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Amendment protects the delivery of legal services through an arrangement
between a nonprofit corporation and lawyers.
The Court extended the holding of Button to situations beyond the civil
rights context in a series of three cases involving unions. The first was
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar.112
There, the Court declared that an injunction prohibiting the Brotherhood from
advising injured workers to obtain legal advice violated the First
Amendment.1 3 The Court protected the lawyers' rights to speak as well as the
prospective clients' rights to hear. 114 Again, as Professor Munneke notes, like
Button, "an innovative service delivery system was upheld despite the
arrangement's violation of ethical rules. In fact, Trainmen dealt specifically
with a practice delivery system involving both lawyers and nonlawyers. '"115 In
United Mine Workers, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n,116 the Court
clarified that Button was not meant to be limited solely to political litigation and
struck another injunction brought by a state bar organization to prohibit a union
from hiring an attorney to advise members in processing workers'
compensation claims." 7 The Court held "that the freedom of speech, assembly,
and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments gives.., the
right to hire attorneys ... to assist ... in the assertion of... legal rights."' 18
Several years later the Court reaffirmed Button in United Transportation Union
v. State Bar, observing that "meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental
right within the protection of the First Amendment."' '9
The union cases build upon Button in three important ways. First, they
clarify that the First Amendment protects legal advice and advocacy not only
about political and civil rights, but also about other matters. Second, they
suggest that the First Amendment protects a legal services delivery system
involving nonprofit corporations, nonlawyers, and lawyers. Third, while Button
and the union cases focused on whose rights were at stake (i.e. the First
112377 U.S. 1 (1964).
l13d at 7 ("A State could not, by invoking the power to regulate the professional
conduct of attorneys, infringe in any way the right of individuals and the public to be fairly
represented in lawsuits authorized by Congress to effectuate a basic public interest. Laymen
cannot be expected to know how to protect their rights when dealing with practiced and
carefully counseled adversaries . .
14Id
"
115 Munneke, supra note 89, at 604 (citation omitted).
116389 U.S. 217 (1967).
117Id at 223 ("The litigation in question is, of course, not bound up with political
matters of acute social moment, as in Button, but the First Amendment does not protect
speech... only to the extent it can be characterized as political. Great secular causes, with
small ones, are guarded. The grievances for redress of which the right of petition was
insured, and with it the right of assembly, are not solely religious or political ones. And the
rights of free speech and a free press are not confined to any field of human interest."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
118Id at 221-22 (footnote omitted).
119410 U.S. 576, 585 (1971).
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Amendment protection of the lawyers' rights to speak and of the prospective
clients' rights to hear) these cases also protected what was being said (i.e. the
First Amendment protection of legal advice). Another case that builds upon
Button in a consequential way for purposes here is Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez. 120
B. Legal Advocacy/Advice as Protected Speech and Legal Services Corp.
v. Velazquez
In Velazquez, a 5-4 majority struck, on First Amendment grounds, a federal
restriction that prevented attorneys for the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) (a
congressionally created nonprofit organization providing legal assistance in
civil matters) from challenging the validity of a state or federal statute. 121 Under
the challenged restriction, the LSC attorneys were required to cease
representation immediately if a question about a statute's validity arose,
whether "during initial attorney-client consultations or in the midst of litigation
proceedings."1 22
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, raised several concerns tied to the
First Amendment about this predicament. First, he observed that the legislative
restriction prevented attorneys not only from advising clients, but also from
advising a court about "serious questions of statutory validity."' 123 Such an
arrangement, Kennedy wrote, "is inconsistent with the proposition that
attorneys should present all the reasonable and well-grounded arguments
necessary for proper resolution of the case." 124 Second, a ban on "the analysis
of certain legal issues" in effect "prohibits speech and expression upon which
courts must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power."' 125 Third, the
arrangement, he observed, "insulate[s] the Government's laws from judicial
120See 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (holding that the federal government's prohibition
against challenging the validity of welfare laws, by attorneys working for a congressionally
created legal aid organization, is a violation of the First Amendment).
121 See id. at 536-37 ("[T]he restriction... prohibits legal representation funded by
recipients of LSC moneys if the representation involves an effort to amend or otherwise
challenge existing welfare law."). Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter
formed the majority. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas joined. See id. at 549 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The particular restriction under dispute "prevent[ed] an attorney from arguing to a court that
a . . . state or federal statue by its terms or in its application is violative of the United States
Constitution." Id. at 537 (majority opinion). It should be noted that other LSC restrictions on
lobbying, class actions, attorney's fees, and solicitation have been upheld in the lower
courts. See, e.g., Legal Aid Servs. of Or. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 608 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th
Cir. 2010) (upholding "restrictions on lobbying, soliciting clients, and participating in class
actions").
122 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545.
123 Id.
1241Id.
125 Id.
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inquiry."' 126 Finally, Justice Kennedy expressed concern that, if the legislative
restriction was validated by the Court, "there would be lingering doubt whether
the truncated representation had resulted in ... full advice to the client."' 12 7 As a
consequence both "[t]he courts and the public" would be left "to question the
adequacy and fairness of professional representations when the
attorney... avoided all reference to questions of [the banned advice]."'1 28 In
recognizing the importance of "an informed, independent bar,"' 129 he further
noted that "[w]e must be vigilant when Congress imposes rules and conditions
which in effect insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge."' 130
The ban on delivery of legal services by corporations (through the
ownership of law practices) raises the same kinds of constitutional concerns as
the ban struck down by the Court in Velazquez. Justice Kennedy went to great
lengths to explain the importance of legal speech (i.e., advice and advocacy) to
the judiciary and to democratic government. Preventing corporations from
entering the legal services market silences a significant source of legal advice
and advocacy. 13 1 The judiciary, itself, has a strong First Amendment interest in
this speech, as it is a critical listener in the process of legal service delivery. 132
Rules that impair the range or amount of legal advice and advocacy that might
reach the judiciary unconstitutionally burden the First Amendment.
Notwithstanding the holdings of Button and the union cases, as well as
Velazquez, courts and commentators limit the reach of these decisions because
they did not involve for-profit corporations, and thus did not present the concern
that a lawyer's loyalty to a client might be compromised by pressure to increase
profits to satisfy corporate executives or shareholders. 133 After Citizens United,
this rationale no longer holds up. Before exploring the impact of Citizens
United, however, it is important to consider the Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence, particularly the lawyer advertising cases. For even if the Court
declines to treat legal advice and advocacy speech like political speech and
instead accords it only traditional commercial speech protection, bans on
126Id. at 546.
127Id.
128 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546.
129Id. at 545.
130I. at 548; see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 787 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("Laws punishing speech which protests the lawfulness or morality of the
government's own policy are the essence of the tyrannical power the First Amendment
guards against.").
131 Special thanks to Mae Kuykendall for reminding me to think about the implications
of Velazquez in this context, and the impact on the availability of legal advice as well as
advocacy if corporations are not permitted to fund and/or deliver legal services. For an
expanded argument on the implications of Velazquez and First Amendment protection for
legal advice, see generally Knake, supra note 20.
1321 thank Mae Kuykendall and David Udell for reminding me to consider the
judiciary's free speech interests.
133 See cases cited supra note 53.
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corporate investment into law practices are likely to fail under Central
Hudson.134
C. The Commercial Speech Cases and Bates v. State Bar
Commercial speech jurisprudence, particularly the line of cases on lawyer
advertising, endorses the notion of a corporation's right to own and invest in
law practices (and the corresponding rights of recipients of the speech that
results from such a relationship). The Court consistently has rejected the state's
proffer of professionalism and lawyer independence as grounds for suppressing
truthful information 35 about legal services, in part based upon the lawyer's
speech interest in communicating about her services but equally (if not mostly)
based upon the listener's interest in hearing speech about legal services.
Traditionally the Court has claimed, at least in form, to scrutinize commercial
speech restrictions on an intermediate level, something less than political
speech's strict scrutiny but requiring more from Congress or the states than a
rational basis to justify a speech regulation. The test requires that "[i]f the
communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity,
the ... State must assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on
commercial speech."' 136
Yet, the line between commercial speech and political speech is blurry,
especially when it comes to commercial speech about meaningful access to the
law. "Access-to-the-law" or "delivery-of-legal-services" speech in many ways
serves the same function as political speech. Much of the information about
enforcement of legal rights and entitlements is increasingly delivered via a
commercial process, in part because of technological advances and in part
because of the associated costs. 137 But does the speech, which is afforded the
highest level of constitutional protection in Button, lose some of that protection
if it is delivered through a commercial mechanism? Surely not, at least
134 See infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
135 On the value of "informational function" to the First Amendment, see Ronald K.L.
Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REv. 697, 730
(1993). Collins and Skover have written that "[t]his 'informational function' is central to the
Court's approval of commercial expression as a form of protected speech." Id. (citing Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)). They further
explain that, "of the major commercial speech cases in which governmental regulation has
been invalidated, nearly all 'involved restrictions on either purely or predominantly
informational speech, such as the bans on price advertising.' By comparison, governmental
regulations were sustained in cases not involving 'predominantly informational
advertising."' Collins & Skover, supra, at 730 (footnote omitted) (quoting Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial Speech, 56 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1205, 1229 (1988)).
136 Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
137 See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 101, at 2 ("In light of modem economic realities and
the structure of modem communications, expression often requires significant financial
resources in order to be effective.").
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according to Justice Blackmun, who wrote in his pre-argument memorandum in
Bigelow v. Virginia138 that "[c]ommercial speech is not per se more lowly than
other forms."' 139 The Court reinforced this stance in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island, where Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg)
noted that "[t]he mere fact that messages propose commercial transactions does
not in and of itself dictate the constitutional analysis that should apply to
decisions to suppress them."'140 Indeed, "complete speech bans," like the bans
on corporate ownership of law practices, "are particularly dangerous because
they all but foreclose alternative means of disseminating certain
information."'141
The public's interest in receiving or hearing information is a driving force
in First Amendment jurisprudence. In the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court first
held that advertising about a medical procedure is protected speech under the
First Amendment in Bigelow,142 and soon thereafter extended the holding to
prescription drug advertising in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,143 and then to lawyer advertising in Bates v.
State Bar.144 In all of these cases, central to the Court's reasoning was the
public's interest in access to information. 145 That the speech includes an
element of financial gain does not mean the State is "free of constitutional
constraint." 146 Notably, the Court considered not only the interests of the
138421 U.S. 809 (1975).
139 LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME
COURT JOURNEY 117 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996). As a point of clarification, I note that Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, VII, and VIII; an opinion with
respect to Parts III and V in which Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg joined; an
opinion with respect to Part VI in which Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined;
and an opinion with respect to Part IV, where the language quoted above appears, in which
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg joined. Id. at 488-89.
141Id. at 501.
142421 U.S. at 829.
143 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
144433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).14 5 See, e.g., Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822 ("The advertisement... did more than simply
propose a commercial transaction. It contained factual material of clear 'public interest."').
As Justice Blackmun wrote in his pre-argument memorandum for Virginia Pharmacy, "The
emphasis in Bigelow was on the public and its right to receive information." GREENHOUSE,
supra note 139, at 119 (internal quotation marks omitted). This emphasis remains a concern
in the modem commercial speech cases, as discussed throughout this Part.
146 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818 ("The State was not free of constitutional restraint merely
because the advertisement involved sales or 'solicitations,' or because appellant was paid for
printing it, or because appellant's motive or the motive of the advertiser may have involved
financial gain." (citations omitted)); see also Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 ("It is
clear... that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to
project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. Speech likewise is protected
even though it is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit, and even though it may involve a
solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute money." (citations omitted)).
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individuals targeted by the advertising, but also of "those with a general
curiosity about, or genuine interest in, the subject matter or the law of another
State and its development, and to readers seeking reform."'' 47 The Court focused
heavily on the fact that "[t]he policy of the First Amendment favors
dissemination of information and opinion."'148 Accordingly, it follows that there
is a "First Amendment right to receive information and ideas, and that freedom
of speech necessarily protects the right to receive [this information]."149
Reflecting on the recipient's interest in the speech, whether that recipient is
an individual, the public as a whole, or a particular entity such as the judiciary,
reveals why the commercial speech versus political speech distinction is so
easily blurred. Indeed, as the Virginia Pharmacy Court observed, a recipient's
interest in commercial information "may be as keen, if not keener by far, than
his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."' 150
The paternalistic nature of the state restrictions also troubled the Virginia
Pharmacy Court. For example, in rejecting independence and professionalism
as a justification for a ban on advertising, the Court was especially concerned
that the "[s]tate's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the
advantages of their being kept in ignorance."' 151 As commentators note, keeping
citizens in ignorance "is as threatening to core democratic values as the
suppression of any speaker." 152 The better alternative to paternalism for the
Court "is to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them."' 153 In the end, "[i]f they are truly open, nothing prevents the
'professional' pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly superior product,
and contrasting it with that of the low-cost, high-volume prescription drug
retailer,"' 154 just as nothing prevents traditional law firms from offering their
services and contrasting them with those offered by a law firm owned by a
corporation.
This is true, said the Court later in Central Hudson, "[e]ven when
advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, [for]
the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no
147 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 822.
148 1d. at 829.
149 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 Id. at 763.
151Id. at 769; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 503 (1996)
("The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.").152 Martin H. Redish & Abby Marie Mollen, Understanding Post's and Meiklejohn's
Mistakes: The Central Role of Adversary Democracy in the Theory of Free Expression, 103
Nw. U. L. REv. 1303, 1337 (2009).
153 Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
154Id.
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information at all."' 155 Thus, even under Central Hudson's commercial speech
intermediate-type test, state bans on corporate investment in law practices
necessarily fail, because "[t]he regulatory technique may extend only as far as
the interests it serves. The State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to
the asserted state interest, nor can it completely suppress information when
narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as well. 1 56 The
Court's lawyer-advertising precedent offers a useful illustration.
Striking state bans on corporations from owning or investing in law
practices would not be the first instance of such a sweeping action related to the
regulation of lawyers. The Justices took a similar path in Bates, finding
unconstitutional Arizona's ban on advertising by lawyers. 157 At the time, lawyer
advertising was not allowed under the Model Rules, just like the modem ban on
law practice ownership/investment by nonlawyer corporations. "Even though
economic considerations were involved in Bates," notes Professor Munneke,
"the seminal issue involved the free expression of an idea about the nature of
the practice of law that could not be given force without violating the
disciplinary rule." 158 According to Munneke, "The same expressive value
appears in the ABA debate, in the statements of the ancillary business
proponents."' 59 "In fact," Munneke explains,
the political nature of the debate, the forum in which the ideas are being
discussed, and the process by which compromise has been achieved lead
inexorably to the conclusion that this is the very type of robust debate on issues
of public concern that the First Amendment seeks to foster. 16 0
Munneke's argument about the expressive value and political nature of the
debate on ancillary business restrictions is equally, if not more, compelling in
the context of corporate ownership of law practices. The First Amendment
value associated with corporate ownership, however, extends far beyond the
semantics of the debate. Ownership and investment from corporations promises
competition in the legal marketplace as well as increased capital and funding for
meritorious litigation.161 Under the reasoning of Button,162 significant First
Amendment value is drawn from enhanced opportunities for affordable,
accessible legal representation where otherwise a right might go unenforced or a
wrong might go unaddressed.
Another parallel between the ban on corporate ownership and the ban on
lawyer advertising is the professionalism justification sometimes advanced in
155 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
156Id. at 565 (citation omitted).
157 See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977).
158 Munneke, supra note 89, at 602.
159id.
160Id. at 602 n.290.
161 See discussion infra Part IV.
162 See discussion supra Part III.A.
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support of the ban on external investment. As the Bates Court noted, "[T]he ban
on advertising originated as a rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics."
163
Authoring the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun explained:
Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form of public service,
rather than as a means of earning a living, and they looked down on 'trade' as
unseemly. Eventually, the attitude toward advertising fostered by this view
evolved into an aspect of the ethics of the profession. 164
The majority found noteworthy the fact that the British view about advertising
seemed to be changing at the time Bates was argued, 165 just as now the British
view about law practice ownership and investment by corporations undoubtedly
is changing in light of the 2007 adoption of the Legal Services Act allowing for
nonlawyer ownership.1 66 The Bates majority rejected the Arizona State Bar's
"adverse-effect-on-professionalism" argument, stating that "we find the
postulated connection between advertising and the erosion of true
professionalism to be severely strained."'167 So, too, it is with the debate about
corporations and the delivery of legal services. Some believe corporate delivery
of legal services will harm professionalism and the reputation of lawyers.
Others maintain that the failure to permit corporate delivery of legal services
has fueled not only the public disillusionment identified in Bates but also the
lack of access to affordable legal representation.
163Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977); see also Nat Stem, Commercial
Speech, "Irrational'" Clients, and the Persistence of Bans on Subjective Lawyer Advertising,
2009 BYU L. REV. 1221, 1252 (noting that the Court routinely invalidates "commercial
speech restrictions on the basis of the state's condescending estimate of the capacities of its
citizens").
164 Bates, 433 U.S. at 371 (footnote omitted) (citing HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcS
210-11 (1953)).
165 Id. at 371 n.24 ("The British view may be changing. An official British Commission
recently presented reports to Parliament recommending that solicitors be permitted to
advertise.").
166 See discussion of the United Kingdom's Legal Services Act of 2007 infra notes 226-
41 and accompanying text.
167 Bates, 433 U.S. at 368. As Justice Blackmun wrote, "[T]he assertion that advertising
will diminish the attorney's reputation in the community is open to question. Bankers and
engineers advertise, and yet these professions are not regarded as undignified." Id at 369-70
(footnote omitted). "In fact," he continued, "it has been suggested that the failure of lawyers
to advertise creates public disillusionment with the profession." Id. at 370 (citing MONROE
H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 115-16 (1975)). The majority
further noted:
The absence of advertising may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach out
and serve the community: Studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel even
when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or because of an
inability to locate a competent attorney.
Id. at 370 (footnote omitted).
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The Bates majority similarly rejected arguments from the Arizona State Bar
about the "adverse effect on the administration of justice" that are relevant to
the corporate ownership debate. 168 Just as some suggest that corporate
ownership or investment might increase litigation, "[a]dvertising is said to have
the undesirable effect of stirring up litigation."'1 69 Yet this factor did not trouble
the majority: "Although advertising might increase the use of the judicial
machinery, we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action."' 170 Furthermore, the
Court was concerned about the "burden to access on legal services."'171 The ban
on corporate ownership is susceptible to this criticism as well. Justice Blackmun
concluded that "[a] rule allowing restrained advertising would be in accord with
the bar's obligation to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers,
and to assist in making legal services fully available. ' 172 The same logic applies
to "restrained" ownership of law practices by corporations.' 73
As Martin Redish has written, "Just as respected theorists have asserted that
political speech facilitates the process of self-government by making the
individual a more informed voter, so, too, does commercial speech facilitate the
process of private self-government, by making individuals better informed in
making private life-affecting choices."'174 In Redish's view, "[b]oth types of
expression, then, foster the same free speech value because both promote and
inform the exercise of self-governing decision making."' 175 As such, "both
forms of expression facilitate the fundamental democratic values of self-
determination and self-realization."' 176
If political speech and commercial speech should be protected in the way
Redish advocates, then why not speech that furthers meaningful access to the
law by facilitating enhanced alternatives of legal services delivery? Consider
also the freedom of the press. 177 A regulation banning corporations from
owning or investing in newspapers or media companies is unthinkable under the
1681d. at 375-76.
169Id. at 375.
170Id. at 376.
171Id. at 376-77.
172 Id. at 377 (internal quotation marks omitted).
173 Also relevant to corporate ownership of law firms is another argument rejected by
the Bates Court: the "undesirable economic effects of advertising." See Bates, 433 U.S. at
377. Justice Blackmun countered that "[i]t is entirely possible that advertising will serve to
reduce, not advance, the cost of legal services to the consumer." Id. As for the argument that
the quality of legal services would suffer when lawyers advertise, Blackmun observed that
"[r]estraints on advertising... are an ineffective way of deterring shoddy work. An attorney
who is inclined to cut quality will do so regardless of the rule on advertising." Id at 378.
174 REDISH, supra note 101, at 19 (footnote omitted).
175Id.
176 Id. But see generally Robert C. Post, Viewpoint Discrimination and Commercial
Speech, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 169 (2007) (writing in response to Redish).
1771 credit Ronald K.L. Collins with the suggestion that I consider the analogy of the
corporation's relationship to the press.
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First Amendment given the centrality of the press to our democratic
government. How are regulations banning corporations from owning or
investing in law practices any different, given the equally central role of
lawyers' advice and advocacy in our democratic government? 17 8
Over thirty years after Bates, concerns about the cost of legal services and
the availability of affordable, competent attorneys persist, 179 intensified by
recent economic distress. 180 Professional conduct rules prohibiting corporations
from owning or investing in law practices impair meaningful access to the
courts and compromise the delivery of information about legal rights and their
enforcement.181 They raise precisely the same concerns warranting
constitutional protection in Button and the lawyer advertising cases that since
have followed.
D. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n and In re Primus
Two other lawyer-solicitation cases deserve mention. In 1978, the Court
decided Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass 'n182 and In re Primus183 on the same
day. In Ohralik, the Court determined that the state could ban an ambulance
chaser from in-person solicitation, 184 but in Primus the Court held that the state
could not ban an ACLU lawyer from informing potential litigants about their
constitutional rights.185 One might reconcile these decisions by looking to the
fact that Ohralik solicited for pecuniary gain, 186 whereas the ACLU lawyer
178 As I have written elsewhere, "The role of an attorney in navigating and, when
necessary, challenging the law is a critical component of American democratic government."
Knake, supra note 20, at 642-43.
179 These concerns are reflected in the dissent authored by Justice Kennedy and joined
by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,
642-44 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Cf FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 87, at 333-36
(discussing Went For It and other post-Bates cases).
180 See, e.g., John T. Broderick Jr. & Ronald M. George, Op-Ed., A Nation of Do-It-
Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A21 ("As the economy has worsened, the
ranks of the self-represented poor have expanded. In a recent informal study conducted by
the Self-Represented Litigation Network, about half the judges who responded reported a
greater number of pro se litigants as a result of the economic crisis. Unrepresented litigants
now also include many in the middle class and small-business owners who unexpectedly
find themselves in distress and without sufficient resources to pay for the legal assistance
they need."); Gillian Hadfield, A Case for Legal Aid at Wal-Mart, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2010, at A17 ("Americans have a much higher rate of simply giving up in the face of legal
difficulties, with effectively nowhere to turn if they cannot afford a lawyer who comes at a
minimum price of $150 an hour.").
181 See discussion infra Part IV.
182436 U.S. 447 (1978).
183436 U.S. 412 (1978).
184 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467-68.
185 Primus, 436 U.S. at 439.186 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 450.
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offered services free of charge (though still received salary from the ACLU). 187
And, so the argument might go, it follows that a corporation, in seeking a profit
when offering legal services, should be treated more like an ambulance chaser
than an ACLU lawyer. I disagree. A Wal-Mart-law-type delivery mechanism,
for all practical purposes, need not be anything like the proverbial ambulance
chaser. Rather than rushing in to prey on the vulnerable accident victim, we
instead would have access to a de-mystified legal services provider, where
customers could learn about services in a neutral atmosphere as they conduct
everyday shopping.
Of course, this is not to suggest that the states may not regulate aspects of
nonlawyer corporate law practice ownership and investment. Indeed, they can
and they should. 188 The Court reinforced this distinction between an outright
ban and appropriate regulation in Citizens United, holding that in the political
campaign context, "[t]he Government may regulate corporate political speech
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not suppress that
speech altogether."'189 Law practice ownership/investment by corporations
should be treated the same way.
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently decided another commercial speech
case that further supports an expanded reading of Button and its progeny. In
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., the Court held that a Vermont statute restricting the
sale and use of pharmacy records to so-called data miners violated the First
Amendment.1 90 Writing the 6-3 majority opinion, Justice Kennedy reaffirmed
the view of the Bates Court that the "consumer's concern for the free flow of
commercial speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue."' 191 He further observed that "the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment."'' 92
The Sorrell Court's recognition that "creation and dissemination of
information" constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment 93 is
critical to understanding the constitutional significance of corporate delivery of
legal services. The corporation is uniquely situated to engage in wide-scale
creation and dissemination of legal representation in a way that currently does
not occur largely due to cost restraints associated with economies of scale. It
simply is not economically feasible for a traditional law firm to market and
deliver en masse representation to the general public for routine wills, child
187 Primus, 436 U.S. at 422.
188 For example, in one of the more recent lawyer advertising cases to reach the Court,
the majority upheld a thirty-day ban on direct-mail solicitation targeted to accident victims,
reasoning that while states cannot prohibit advertising speech outright, they may regulate it.
See Fla. Barv. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
189 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
190 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
191 Id. at 2664 (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
192Id. at 2667 (emphasis added).
193 Id.
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custody, divorce, mortgage foreclosure, standard contracts, small business
needs, immigration, bankruptcy, housing disputes, and other basic matters.
One significant difference between the lawyer-advertising cases and the ban
on corporate delivery of legal services is that the former regulated speech, not
speakers, whereas in the latter, potential speakers are excluded. As a result, not
only are corporations unable to engage with lawyers to deliver legal services,
but an entire realm of potential speech about access to law is, effectively, shut
down. In the following discussion, I explain how Citizens United lends further
force to my argument that corporations hold a First Amendment right to deliver
legal services, thereby increasing speech about the law and enhancing access to
it.
E. Corporate Speech: Citizens United v. FEC
Citizens United-while involving very different facts on its face than those
presented by corporate ownership of law practices-accomplished at least two
tasks related to our understanding of the free speech interests bound up in
access to the law and the delivery of legal services: (1) the majority reaffirmed
the strength of First Amendment protections afforded to corporations, 194 and (2)
the holding of the case broadens.prior decisions related to the need for speech to
further economic competition. The Court applied strict scrutiny on political
speech grounds to strike down a federal law prohibiting corporations and unions
from spending general funds as independent expenditures for "electioneering
communication" or "speech expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
candidate."' 195 Justice Kennedy, writing the 5-4 opinion, explained that the
federal law's purpose was "to prevent corporations ... from presenting both
facts and opinions to the public." 196 Such a purpose runs counter to the
principle, he explained, "that the Government may not suppress political speech
on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity. No sufficient governmental
interest justifies limits on the political speech of nonprofit or for-profit
corporations." 197 Kennedy further observed that "[c]orporations and other
associations, like individuals, contribute to the discussion, debate, and the
dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to
19 4 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 ("The Court has thus rejected the argument
that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under
the First Amendment simply because such associations are not natural persons." (internal
quotation marks omitted)). But see Jeffrey D. Clements, Beyond Citizens United v. FEC: Re-
Examining Corporate Rights, ADVANCE, Fall 2010, at 37, 42-43 ("Repeatedly, the Court has
held that corporations are not citizens under [the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV], or... the Fourteenth Amendment.").
195 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886, 898-99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1961d. at 907.
19 71d. at 913.
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foster."1 98 Under this reasoning, Citizens United can be understood to extend to
all corporations the right to engage with lawyers in the delivery of legal services
as protected by Button (for constitutional rights and civil rights) and the union
cases (for other matters).
Over the years the Court has upheld a number of restrictions involving
speech related to lawyers, 199 and in most of these cases the restriction was
justified, at least in part, by an interest in allowing the state bar (or Congress, as
was the case during the 2009 Term200) to perform its functions.20 1 The Citizens
United majority identified other contexts where "a narrow class of speech
restrictions.. . that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons... based on
an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions" was
upheld.202 Nevertheless, the "corporate independent expenditures at issue" in
Citizens United were found to "not interfere with governmental functions, so
these cases are inapposite. '" 203 The same can be said for corporate financing of
law practices. As the majority concluded, "We find no basis for the proposition
that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions
on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this
conclusion." 204 Likewise, it follows that in the context of Button's protected
1981d. at 900 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
199 For a comprehensive list of cases addressing the First Amendment and the regulation
of attorney speech, see Knake, supra note 20, at 660-63.200 See Renee Newman Knake, The Supreme Court's Increased Attention to the Law of
Lawyering: Mere Coincidence or Something More?, 59 AM. U. L. REv. 1499, 1499-1500,
1508-13 (2010) (discussing the Court's validation of federal statutes constraining legal
advice in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324 (2010), and
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010), two cases decided during the
2009 Term).
201 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S 626, 642 (1985) (holding
that disciplinary rules could mandate disclosure regarding payment of costs in
advertisement, but that the First Amendment protected attorney so long as the advertisement
was truthful and nondeceptive); see also Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1329, 1331 (applying
Zauderer to uphold mandated disclosure in advertising by lawyers for bankruptcy-related
services); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U. S. 618, 620 (1995) (holding that a thirty-day
prohibition on direct-mail solicitation by lawyers of personal injury or wrongful death clients
withstood First Amendment scrutiny); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449
(1978) (upholding ban on in-person solicitation of personal injury victims). See generally W.
Bradley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305 (2001) (exploring
lawyer-related free speech issues in a variety of contexts).
202 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (listing governmental entities such as public
schools, the corrections system, the military, and federal civil service).
2 03 1d. ("These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain
governmental functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of
speech. By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be
free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their
votes.").204 Id.
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delivery of legal services, the government may not impose restrictions on
disfavored speakers, in this case the corporation.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, further explained that freedom of
speech includes "the freedom to speak in association with other individuals,
including association in the corporate form."20 5 In this way, Citizens United
expands to for-profit corporations Button's protections for the association of
nonprofit corporations and lawyers to deliver legal advice and advocacy:
[T]hat state law grants corporations special advantages-such as limited
liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and
distribution of assets. . . does not suffice ... to allow laws prohibiting speech.
It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of those special
advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.206
And Justice Kennedy, in authoring the majority opinion, emphasized that where
a question exists about the protection warranted, the First Amendment demands
we "give the benefit of any doubt to protecting rather than stifling speech. ' '207
Notwithstanding the Court's holding, Professor Jeffrey Clements argues
that "[n]othing in the First Amendment requires that states, Congress, and the
Court ignore the capacity of the 'speaker' when that very capacity exists as a
result of government policy." 208 The First Amendment value, however, is not
concerned with who is speaking but rather with the speech itself and the
delivery of it. What can be more valuable than speech about the entitlements,
obligations, and prohibitions under the law or the method used to deliver that
speech broadly?
As in the earlier discussions of Button, Velazquez, and the commercial
speech cases, the rights of the listener also are relevant to the Court's decision
in Citizens United and to the analysis here. Justice Kennedy explains that
"[w]hen Government seeks to use its full power.., to command where a person
may get his or her information or what distrusted source he or she may not hear,
it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The First Amendment
confirms the freedom to think for ourselves. ' 209 The protected expression for
the listener (or, in the case of corporate ownership, the prospective client) is as
important as the protected expression for the speaker, or the corporation.210 As
205Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J., and joined in part by Thomas,
J.). 206 1d. at 905 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207 1d. at 891 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)
(Roberts, C.J.) (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964))) (alteration
omitted) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
208 Clements, supra note 194, at 44.
209 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908.
2 10 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 635 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, J.J.) ("The Court today undercuts this
guarantee in an important class of cases and unsettles leading First Amendment precedents,
at the expense of those victims most in need of legal assistance.").
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Button and the union cases teach us, this is especially true when the
listener/client is a prospective client receiving advice about the enforcement of
constitutional or other rights. This is equally true, under the reasoning of
Velazquez, when the listener is the judiciary.
A word about Citizens United's impact on commercial speech is also
warranted here. Professor Randall Bezanson argues that in applying strict
scrutiny, the Citizens United majority "reject[ed] value or usefulness as relevant
at all and... infuse[d] the corporation with the liberty and freedom accorded
the individual under the First Amendment."'211 Consequently, he observes, "it
will be impossible in principle to treat commercial speech by corporations as
anything less than fully protected speech." 212 Similarly, Professor Tamara Piety
contends that the Citizens United characterization of corporations as "'citizens,'
as if they were real persons[,] ... bolsters arguments for treating commercial
speech like fully protected speech because it trains the analysis on the speaker
instead of the listener." 213 Whether Citizens United sounded the death knell for
commercial speech doctrine as suggested by Professors Bezanson and Piety is
beyond the scope of this Article. In the limited context of legal services
delivery, however, which involves bans on external investment that, in essence,
function as content regulation that suppresses ideas, it is difficult to see how the
Court can maintain this artificial distinction between political versus
commercial speech.
As the foregoing discussion reveals, commercial speech about the delivery
of legal services is inherently political speech, speech that goes to the heart of
meaningful access to the law, speech deserving of the strongest protection that
the Constitution offers. Of course, we need not go so far as to collapse the two
tests entirely, even if some commentators foresee this as a possibility.214 Model
Rule 5.4's blanket ban on corporate ownership of law practices runs afoul of the
First Amendment whether we apply strict scrutiny or commercial speech
scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, even assuming the government has a compelling
interest in banning such ownership structures based upon concerns of lawyer
independence, professionalism, and client protection, the total prohibition is not
211 Bezanson, supra note 56, at 659. For a pre-Citizens United argument against the
commercial-political speech distinction in the context of corporate governance speech, see
Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Governance Speech and the First
Amendment, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 163, 205 (1994) ("Even if the dubious distinction between
commercial and political speech continues to be accepted, regulation of corporate
governance speech should be subject to a high level of scrutiny under the First
Amendment.").
2 12 Bezanson, supra note 56, at 659.
213 Piety, supra note 58, at 16. Professor Piety goes on to address the inevitable
consequences of treating commercial speech as fully protected, noting in particular that this
"would likely strangle in their infancy recent and proposed regulatory reforms such as the
new tobacco regulation, the financial reform act[,] ... and the Interagency Agency Working
Group on Foods Marketed to Children... to name just a few." Id. at 16-17 (footnotes
omitted).2 14 See discussion supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text.
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narrowly tailored to achieve these objectives, nor is it the least restrictive means
for doing so. Likewise, under Central Hudson's test for commercial speech,
again even assuming the government's interest is substantial, the complete ban
is more restrictive than necessary.
IV. WAL-MARTLAW, GOOGLELAW, COMING SOON...
The primary focus of my argument rests on the First Amendment
jurisprudential thread sparked by NAACP v. Button, but it is notable that the
Court's expansion of First Amendment rights for corporations parallels the
economics of law practice and the regulatory changes taking place in other
countries. My reading of the First Amendment jurisprudence corresponds with
the normative concerns of market competition and access to the law. Now is the
time for bar authorities, academics, members of the legal profession, and others
to begin exploring, and, importantly, embracing the reality of corporate
ownership and investment for law practices. A number of scholars and experts
already are engaging in this endeavor, and we soon will have the benefit of
learning from recent reforms in Australia and the United Kingdom that allow
for nonlawyer ownership of law practices.
Several noted law professors, business scholars, and economists also have
weighed in on the side of nonlawyer corporate ownership. Professors Edward
Adams and John Matheson published in 1998 a leading article that advances
this position. 215 Their work offered a detailed history of the ban on corporate
ownership and refuted arguments levied against corporate ownership of law
practices over the years, such as "fear of corporate giants, interference with
professional independence and judgment, breaching of client confidences,
unauthorized practice of law, and the danger of the legal profession becoming
too businesslike. ' '216 Instead, they advocated for the lifting of state restrictions
on nonlawyer investment in law practices and indicate that the benefits of this
proposal "include capital for expansion, capital for investment in new
technologies and new lawyers, financing for contingency fee cases, and a
myriad of other rewards." 217
Likewise, Professor Larry Ribstein repeatedly advanced arguments
favorable to lifting the ownership and investment restrictions. For example, in
his article, The Death of Big Law, he described possible forms including: (1)
outright incorporation of a law firm with a dual-level of shares for giving
lawyers control; (2) the sale of legal services by in-house counsel; (3)
multidisciplinary firms; and (4) retail operations like Wal-Mart. 218 In an earlier
essay, Want to Own a Law Firm?, Ribstein asserted that the public trading of
2 15 See generally Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big
Board?: A Proposal for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALiF. L. REV. 1 (1998).
216Id. at 40; see also id. at 14-24.
217Id. at 40.
2 18 See Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WiS. L. REv. 749, 792, 797-800.
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law firms "would make it harder for lawyers and law firms to deny that they
really are businesses," resulting in a benefit, in that "[i]nstead of driving out the
last vestige of professionalism, going public will clarify professionalism's role
in the business of law practice." 219 Professor Laurel Terry also has pressed
authorities to consider the economic rationale for legal services regulation.220
While Ribstein and scholars like Mitt Regan, Charles Wolfram, and others
would advocate relaxing, if not removing, the restrictions, 221 some remain
resistant.222
2 19 Larry E. Ribstein, Want to Own a Law Firm?, AMERICAN (May 30, 2007),
http://www.american.com/archive/2007/may-0507/want-to-own-a-law-firm.
220 See, e.g., Laurel S. Terry, Understanding the Economic Rationale for Legal Services
Regulation: The Importance of Interdisciplinary Dialogue 11 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=- 1909644.
221See Mark I. Harrison & Mary Gray Davidson, The Ethical Implications of
Partnerships and Other Associations Involving American and Foreign Lawyers, 22 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REv. 639, 639 (2004) ("address[ing] the impact of globalization on legal services
and the ethical issues raised by the phenomenon in which U.S. and non-U.S. lawyers form
partnerships and other associations"); Bruce MacEwen, Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Larry
Ribstein, Conversations: Law Firms, Ethics, and Equity Capital, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
61, 63-64, 67 (2008) (discussing the impact of the United Kingdom's Legal Services Act
2007 on American law firms and reflecting on whether "a derivative instrument structured to
reflect the implicit value of the firm" violates Model Rule 5.4); Paul D. Paton,
Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and Reviving the MDP
Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2193, 2196, 2198 (2010) (providing "a historical
review of the MDP debate in the United States and Canada and a summary of changes in
England and Australia that set the stage for the Ethics 20/20 [Commission]"); Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Lawyers, Symbols, and Money: Outside Investment in Law Firms, 27 PENN ST.
INT'L L. REv. 407, 407-08 (2008) (describing the public offering of Australian firm Slater &
Gordon and the United Kingdom's Legal Services Act of 2007, and reviewing the
consequences for American lawyers of moving from a self-regulated to a regulated industry
model); Laurel S. Terry, A Primer on MDPs: Should the "No" Rule Become a New Rule?,
72 TEMP. L. REV. 869, 873 (1999); Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context,
History, and Process, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1625, 1652 (2000) ("Such kinds of bar turf
protection suggest impressive political power and might make a kind of greedy economic
sense for some lawyers in private practice, but little else can be said in its favor. Many
'unauthorized practice' restrictions that have the direct and palpable effect of constricting
consumers' choice of service providers feed popular images of the bar as a guild whose
-primary activity is professional self-aggrandizement. For the public, the loss has been acute.
Surely, an increase in MDP opportunities would provide more widespread and innovative
legal services, as well as more client choice in shopping for legal services."); id. at 1654
("During much of the past century, the bar engaged in another debate-whether law was a
business or a profession. The answer, of course, is that it is both. The business of law and the
business of business are not oil and water as they are sometimes claimed to be by MDP
opponents. Properly regulated to deal with real (rather than imagined) problems, law and
business can function well together. It remains to be seen whether the ABA has a similar
faith in both lawyers and allied professions, and in the wisdom and common sense of law's
own clientele."); Heather A. Miller, Note, Don't Just Check "Yes " or "No ": The Need for
Broader Consideration of Outside Investment in the Law, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 311, 311
(addressing "the controversial issue of outside investment in law firms" and "analyz[ing]
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In addition to the current body of scholarship and commentary on
nonlawyer ownership of law practices, lessons stand to be gained from the
experiments of nonlawyer ownership and investment in Australia and the
United Kingdom, and those under consideration in other countries around the
world. For example, New South Wales passed legislation in July 2001
authorizing incorporated legal practices including multidisciplinary practices.223
In May 2007, Slater & Gordon, a large plaintiffs' law firm, "became the first
law firm in the world to list its entire practice on the Australian Stock
Exchange." 224 By April 2009, nearly 900 Australian firms in New South Wales
had become incorporated legal practices, a number of which incorporated as
multidisciplinary firms, and two of which currently list on the Australian Stock
Exchange. 225
five investment models"); Bernard Sharfman, Note, Modifying Model Rule 5.4 to Allow for
Minority Ownership of Law Firms by Nonlawyers, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 477, 480 (2000)
(recommending "the modification of Model Rules 5.4(b) and (d) to allow for nonlawyer
minority ownership of law firms for investment or other purposes"); Andrew von
Nordenflycht, The Demise of the Professional Partnership? The Emergence and Diffusion of
Publicly-Traded Professional Service Firms 42 (Nov. 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/LegalProfession/documents/vonNordenflycht
Paper.pdf (challenging "the common assumption that the large professional partnership has
thrived because it suits the economic environment of the professional services, specifically
by providing advantages in the attraction, motivation and development of human capitalists"
and suggesting "that the absence of outside ownership in the professional services stems
primarily from two distinctive characteristics: (1) professional norms about appropriate
models of ownership and conflicts of interest; and (2) the typically small size of the firms").22 2 See James R. DeBuse, Note, Opening at $25 1/2 Is Big Firm US.A.: Why America
May Eventually Have a Publicly Traded Law Firm, and Why Law Firms Can Succeed
Without Going Public, 34 J. CoRP. L. 317, 319 (2008) (recommending against public
ownership of law firms and proposing as an alternative that "firms should mimic going
public by going through most of the steps of preparing for public ownership," and
concluding that by doing so, "firms will force themselves to focus on long-term stability and
organizational capital"); Chandler N. Hodge, Note, Law Firms in the US.: To Go Public or
Not to Go Public?, 34 U. DAYTON L. REv. 79, 80 (2008) (concluding that "although the
international legal community is embracing the idea of publicly traded law firms, the U.S.
and its legal community is better served by... keeping ownership and management of law
firms in the hands of lawyers and only lawyers"). See generally Fox, supra note 60.223 See Mark, supra note 49, at 47.
224 Andrew Grech & Kirsten Morrison, Slater & Gordon: The Listing Experience, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 535, 535 (2009); see also Mark, supra note 49, at 53 ("Slater &
Gordon is an Australian law firm specializing in personal injury, commercial, family and
asbestos-related class action law[,] ... [and] is one of Australia's most successful and well-
known plaintiff law firms . . . ."). Anticipating questions about the preservation of the
lawyer's professional independence in this arrangement, the Slater & Gordon prospectus
provides "that where an inconsistency or conflict arises between the duties of the company
(and the duties of the lawyers employed by the company), the company's duty to the court
will prevail over all the duties and the company's duty to its clients will prevail over the duty
to shareholders." Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
225 Mark, supra note 49, at 55.
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The United Kingdom approved a comprehensive overhaul for the regulation
of legal services in October 2007, known as the Legal Services Act.226 Among
its many provisions, the Act provides for corporate involvement in the
investment and management of law firms. For example, the United Kingdom's
"leading supermarket chain," Tesco, has experimented over the years in
offering legal services by contracting with outside lawyers, but now will be able
to do so directly. 227 The services include will writing, do-it-yourself divorce
kits, rental agreements, and forms for setting up a small company.228 By virtue
of its use of the concept, Tesco has been described by some "as a pioneer in this
area and reports suggest that other high street businesses will follow their lead,
perhaps expanding on what Tesco [is] offering, especially in light of the
ownership reform rules. 229
Other large retailers in Great Britain have revealed plans to do exactly that,
whether through a venture similar to that contemplated by Tesco or through a
partnership to utilize retail space like that envisioned by QualitySolicitors as it
moves into WHSmith stores.230 Additional businesses that are developing
innovative ways to deliver legal services as this Article goes to print include
Legal365, LawVest, Parabis Law, Lawyers2You, and more.231 These
alternative business structures are not without critics, and they have met strong
resistance from barristers and solicitors who contend that the idea of retail-
partnerships "provid[ing] legal services is a recipe for disaster. '232 They predict,
reminiscent of the arguments against lawyer advertising in the United States,
that:
Services by these brands will inevitably be provided by unqualified call centre
staff, probably outside the UK, overseen by an inadequate number of in-house
solicitors. The solicitor profession faces being all but wiped out by a
226 For a history and discussion of the United Kingdom's Legal Services Act, see
Whelan, supra note 28, at 467. See also Andrew Boon, Professionalism Under the Legal
Services Act 2007, 17 INT'L J. LEGAL PROF. 195, 195 (2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1911139.
227Jane O'Shea, Tesco Legal Services, ATr'Y MARKETING BLOG (Apr. 23, 2010),
http://www.attorneymarketingnetwork.com/tesco-legal-services/ (Regulators see this as
responding to a need "for an increase in cheaper and more accessible legal advice.").
2 2 8 Id.
229id
"
230 See discussion supra note 31; see also Frances Gibb, Co-Op Steals a March on Tesco
in the Race for New Customers, TIMES, Aug. 27, 2009, at 51, available at
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/essay6811153.ece.
231 See Neil Rose, Focus: Alternative Business Structures-Law and New Order,
LAWYER, Nov. 7, 2011, at 14, 14-15, available at http://www.thelawyer.com/focus-
alternative-business-structures-law-and-new-order/101013 8.article.
232Helen Loveless, Solicitors' Challenge to Tesco as Government Unveils Plan for
Supermarket Legal Advice, DAILY MAIL (May 2, 2009), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/money/
essay-1176678/Solicitors-challenge-Tesco-Govemment-unveils-plans-supermarket-legal-
advice.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
[Vol. 73:1
DEMOCRATIZING THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SER VICES
Government seemingly intent on robbing the public of access to good-quality,
local legal advice. 2 33
Reframing this debate, Professor Christopher Whelan explains:
In the United Kingdom, the idea that the lawyer's professional function is an
essential condition in society has been flatly rejected. The predominant
political view which seems to have emerged is that legal services ought to be
treated more like a business than a profession; they should be regulated by the
market rather than by professional self-regulation.234
Time will tell the accuracy of the predictions on both sides. Regardless, U.S.
regulators stand to learn much from the Australian and United Kingdom
examples.
Professor John Flood, an expert on regulation of the legal profession in the
United Kingdom, forecasts that the changes fueled by the Legal Services Act
"are the most profound in [the legal profession's] history." 235 He notes that
people are skeptical of lawyers, "but they won't mind buying legal services in a
setting [like Wal-Mart that] they know on a daily basis at a price that is clearly
stated."'236 Professor Richard Susskind contends that the liberation of lawyers
and nonlawyers alike through these regulatory changes will cultivate "new and
improved ways of delivering conventional services and will create novel
markets and opportunities where none had been recognized before."
2 37
Likewise, Professor Tom Morgan observes that many law firms are already
functioning like corporations in their management style, and argues that it
follows that nonlawyers should be permitted to invest in the firm or share in the
fees earned by the firm.238 In Morgan's view, "[a]n actual market in shares of a
law firm would give lawyers an incentive to build value and reduce the moral
hazard inherent in decisions about whether to take, or how to handle, a case."
239
He further contends that "a desire to attract and retain outside investors may
tend to impose financial and behavioral discipline on law firms whose members
have not experienced serious pressure to exercise it."'240 Altering Model Rule
5.4 to allow for nonlawyer ownership and investment, according to Morgan,
"should benefit firms, the firms' clients, and the public." 241
Permitting external ownership and investment need not occur at the expense
of professionalism or lawyer independence-the arguments historically raised
233 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
234 Whelan, supra note 28, at 491.
2 3 5 LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
815 (2d ed. 2008) (citation omitted).236Id
"
237 SUSSKIND, supra note 2, at 253-54.
238 See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 168-69 (2010).
239Id. at 169.
240Md. at 170.
241 Id.
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by American bar regulators to resist reform of Model Rule 5.4.242 Indeed, at the
time of this writing, the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, charged with
revision of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to address changes in the
legal profession driven by technology and globalization, continues to express
caution and resistance. 243 The Commission declined to recommend allowing
full nonlawyer ownership and investment,244 though it expressed a willingness
to consider minority activity.245 Even if the ABA were to adopt a proposal
allowing minority nonlawyer ownership, such an arrangement is unlikely to
generate the revolutionary change necessary for delivering meaningful legal
representation on a mass scale.
The Commission's position fails to account for (or fully appreciate) the
realities of the "paradigm shift" that has occurred in the legal profession over
the past twenty years, a shift first identified by Professor Russell Pearce and
others.246 Pearce suggests that "professionalism" for the legal profession "is
socially constructed," meaning that "[i]ts authority rests not on its truth in any
abstract sense, but in its acceptance by the relevant community. '247 Under the
professionalism paradigm, "lawyers differ from businesspersons in that they
possess esoteric knowledge inaccessible to lay persons," and "in contrast to
businesspersons, who maximize financial self-interest, lawyers altruistically
place the good of their clients and the good of society above their own self-
interest. '248 External regulation of the profession, so the argument goes, is then
"both impractical and unnecessary" due to this "combination of inaccessible
knowledge and altruism."249 Lawyer independence is purportedly preserved by
this artificial notion of adhering to professionalism rather than the profit-motive.
The professionalism/independence paradigm ignores the economic realities
of law practice. The fact is that law practice is a business--one increasingly
pressured in the twenty-first century by competition and technological
innovation. In order to "implement" professionalism (or perhaps avoid external
regulation), the legal profession, according to Pearce, historically "proscribed
business conduct as taboo," vilifying the "Profit Maximizer [who] openly
2 42 See Letter from ABA Comm'n, supra note 43, at 6.
2 43 See id at 2.
2 44 See id. at 6.
245See Ethics 20/20 Commission Approves Release of Draft to Allow Nonlawyer
Owners in Firms, 27 LAW. MANUAL ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 505, 527 (Aug. 17,
2011), available at http://www.bna.com/ethics-2020-commission-n12884903114/.246 See Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 1229, 1229 (1995); see also Knake, supra note 200, at 1560-64 (discussing recent
Supreme Court cases and commentary by other scholars "recognizing the consequences of
increased federal regulation and the classification of lawyers as gatekeepers or service
providers"); Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of
Treating Lawyers as "Service Providers, " 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189, 189.
247 Pearce, supra note 246, at 1231.
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markets legal services and competes with other lawyers" tempting "lawyers to
cut ethical comers in search of a buck. '250 This sort of thinking undergirds the
rationale for Model Rule 5.4's ban on outside ownership and investment of law
firms. As an alternative, Pearce proposes a "Middle Range" approach to address
professionalism's concerns with the business pressures of law practice.25' He
conceptualizes a model where the lawyer's independence stems not from
professionalism motives, but from a moral source.252 His proposal "combines
the advantages of a market system with a communitarian moral vision and
retains a place, though a limited one, for the current institutions of the bar."253
Pearce advanced this approach to justify permitting nonlawyers to practice
law in certain circumstances, but his approach offers guidance for responding to
the concerns raised here about Model Rule 5.4 as well. Permitting nonlawyers
to provide legal services, according to Pearce, could lead to a number of
advantages similar to what Susskind, Morgan, Ribstein, and others have
predicted about nonlawyer ownership and investment: (1) improved quality of
legal services, (2) lower costs for consumers, especially less sophisticated
consumers of legal services, (3) enhanced competition resulting in greater
incentives for lawyers to practice law competently and ethically, (4) increased
access to legal services for moderate and low-income individuals, and (5)
greater respect for the legal profession. 254
This, of course, begs the question of what might be lost by removing the
external ownership ban from Model Rule 5.4. I acknowledge that opening
access to the law in this way may very well run the risk of compromising the
administration of justice and the rule of law if not encompassed by sufficient
protections to preserve lawyer independence. I also acknowledge that this
restructuring of Model Rule 5.4 likely will result in an increasingly
institutionalized delivery of legal services. This may mean that legal
representation could become less personal, that individual lawyers may do less
pro bono work, that some solo practitioners will need to join with others in
order to remain viable, and that we may be entering a world where insurance
companies play a stronger role in the legal services market. Yet, these risks are
equally present (if not more threatening) should Model Rule 5.4 remain
unchanged. The economic realities of twenty-first century law practice pose a
host of challenges to lawyer independence, ranging from the pressure of
massive educational debt held by many recent law graduates to the mounting
inefficiency of the billable hour. Indeed, external investment may be the very
thing that preserves lawyer independence-especially given the burdens of law
school debt, billing inefficiencies, and leveraging of overhead costs-thereby
25°Id. at 1242-43 (citations omitted).
251 See id at 1267-75 (discussing proposal for a "Middle Range" approach as an
alternative to "the status quo and market alternatives").
2521d. at 1270.
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allowing for meaningful pro bono representation because the lawyer no longer
needs to worry about maintaining a case-by-case cash flow.
The work of Susskind, Morgan, Pearce, and others offers practical support
for the jurisprudential First Amendment thread identified by this Article, and we
are likely to see more work like theirs arguing for the systemic and individual
gains that might be realized through decreased and/or reformed regulation.255
Their observations about the future of the legal profession demonstrate that
corporate ownership and investment of law practices can democratize legal
services delivery, provided that mechanisms remain in place to ensure lawyer
independence and client protection. Susskind argues that much work on access
to justice is mere lip service, and that we must press for a "richer analysis." 256
To do so, Susskind suggests that:
Improving access to justice.., will require much improved facilities in
place to support clients; to recognize that they need or would benefit from
guidance on dispute resolution, dispute avoidance, and legal health promotion;
to help them identify and select the most appropriate source of guidance; and
to ensure that a wide range of sources are indeed available. 257
This "more ambitious" version of access to justice, Susskind predicts:
should also help us to liberate what I call 'the latent legal market.' I am
alluding here to the innumerable situations, in the domestic and working lives
of all non-lawyers, in which they need and would benefit from legal guidance
(or earlier, more timely, or empowering insight) but obtaining that legal input
today seems to be too costly, excessively time consuming, too cumbersome
and convoluted, or just plain scary. I believe this market will be liberated by
the availability of straightforward, no-nonsense, online legal guidance systems
and by other methods of sourcing legal service. They will not always replace
conventional legal service, but they will provide affordable, easy access to
legal guidance where this may have been unaffordable or impractical in the
past.2 58
Traditional law practice lacks the ability, resources, and motivation to
devise Susskind's "straightforward, no-nonsense, online legal guidance
systems."259 But the corporation does not. Corporations have significant
financial ability and resources. Corporations have strong incentives to offer
255For example, as this Article neared publication, Clifford Winston, Robert W.
Crandall, and Vikram Maheshri published their book, FIRST THING WE Do, LET'S
DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011), arguing on empirical grounds that lawyers and law
consumers would benefit from deregulation of the legal profession, id at 8. In a forthcoming
work, (De)Regulating Lawyers, I plan to address their argument in greater detail.
256 SUSSKIND, supra note 2, at 231.
257 Id. at 234.
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simple, standard, routine legal services in bulk to currently unserved individuals
where profits may be realized through economies of scale and only after a hefty
initial investment. Corporations have broad reach to widely disseminate
information while simultaneously preserving brand reputation and
trustworthiness. And, as this Article has demonstrated, corporations hold
important First Amendment interests related to the delivery of legal services.
Most critically, the individuals in need of a lawyer in the United States today
hold significant First Amendment interests in the delivery of legal services
funded by corporations.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is the first to identify a jurisprudential thread of cases
supporting the corporation's First Amendment right to deliver legal services
through an arrangement involving ownership of or investment in a law practice,
notwithstanding bar regulators' historic distaste for such relationships.
Proponents of corporate law practice ownership and investment maintain that
this will bring affordable representation to the general population and address
the well-documented, unmet need for lawyers. Opponents counter that corporate
involvement will exacerbate the already poor reputation of lawyers, undermine
lawyer independence, and subject lawyers to insurmountable conflicts of
interests driven by a profit motive instead of service to the client. Neither side,
however, seems to fully appreciate the First Amendment interests at stake in the
delivery of legal services.
The blanket suppression of law practice ownership and investment by
corporations under state professional conduct rules is unlikely to withstand a
First Amendment challenge given the legacy of Button v. NAACP, especially in
a post-Citizens United world. This is not to say, however, that a corporation's
delivery of legal services should be left completely unregulated. Now is the
time to permit nonlawyer ownership and investment in law practice under an
appropriate regulatory scheme that will facilitate competition, fuel innovation,
and increase access to quality legal services. 260
Independent of the merits of Model Rule 5.4 in the selection of business
form, my analysis here is, in part, predictive of what the Supreme Court might
do were it presented with this matter, and I offer this prediction in a cautionary
spirit-one that regulators should consider resolving before the issue reaches
the Court. While the line of Supreme Court decisions on lawyer speech
discussed in this Article indicates that the First Amendment encompasses
protection of legal services delivered by corporations, such an opinion from the
Court likely would only perpetuate an already overly complicated and
260The bar would do well to heed the words of caution expressed by Chief Justice
Burger in Bates v. State Bar: "Unfortunately, the legal profession in the past has approached
solutions for the protection of the public with too much caution, and, as a result, too little
progress has been made." 433 U.S. 350, 388 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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somewhat contrived jurisprudence. Moreover, I acknowledge that there are
other ways to accomplish the goal of expanding the delivery of legal services
without going through the First Amendment. Nevertheless, corporate ownership
of law practices has the potential to democratize the delivery of legal services,
particularly among those who currently go without representation. Whether this
is achieved via the First Amendment or not remains an open question, but it is
an important question to be considering given the evolution of the Court's
jurisprudence on lawyer speech.
